Security and the Common Good

Introduction

2010 is the year in which Quakers remember that our peace testimony has a 350-year tradition. This is cause for celebration. But it is also cause for reflection and a call to action. We cannot afford to rest on 350 years of history without ensuring that we live the peace testimony.

The world we live in does not make this easy. In the early part of the 21st century, we are faced with war, famine, conflict, poverty, and epidemics on the one hand and grotesque wealth on the other. We are caught up - whether we like it or not - in a global ‘war on terror’ that constrains everyone’s freedom without addressing the root causes of terror. We are complicit in much of the world’s suffering each time we fill our fridge or our car.

In this context, political developments continue to take us down a road which has little to do with global justice and which is based on an understanding of security that is limited and lacks the insight that security is indivisible. This is despite the fact that some political leaders at least put in words the hopes we all have for a better world. None less so than US President Barack Obama in his inaugural address in January 2009 when he said:

‘As for our common defense, we reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals. Our Founding Fathers, faced with perils that we can scarcely imagine, drafted a charter to assure the rule of law and the rights of man…. Those ideals still light the world and we will not give them up for expedience sake.’

This short paper looks at the extent to which the understanding of security, threats and national interests reflected within the European Union matches up to these ideals applied globally and finds that we still fall woefully short.

European Understanding of Security

The Context

One of the major questions which must underlie any discussion of the European Union’s approach to security is the understanding of threats and security interests which form the basis of any strategic response. The EU agreed a European Security Strategy in 2003; the European Union then undertook a review of this Strategy in 2008 and published a report on this review. Both documents discuss the threats the European Union and the Member States face but are silent on the question of strategic European interests.

Of course, the European Union is made up of 27 Member States and foreign policy is not an EU competence; that is to say, there is a degree of cooperation in matters of foreign policy under the European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); but this is an area still firmly seen as


intergovernmental; that means, the Member States cooperate in this area as far as they can and the other European Institutions have very little influence in this area. The ratification of the Lisbon Treaty at the end of 2009 and its subsequent implementation is not really changing this significantly though the appointment of a High Representative for CFSP who is also a Vice-President of the European Commission and the establishment of a European External Action Service (EEAS) under the Lisbon Treaty may change this gradually.

It is therefore important to look also at the understanding of threats and national interests of the 27 Member States to understand differences and commonalities and the extent to which these impact on the ability of the Member States to develop a common vision and a common approach.

Another interesting question is the time-frame in which the documents were developed and agreed. The oldest of the documents analysed is the National Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic which dates from 1997; the most recent document is the Defence Green Paper of the United Kingdom issued in 2010. Overall, four of the documents predate September 2001; the others post-date it.

**Threat Analysis and Understanding**

Not all the 27 Member States have published security strategies or similar documents. This analysis is therefore based on the documents which are available in the public domain and these are listed in Annex 1 to this paper. The EU Member States missing from this list are: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, and Portugal. A reasonably thorough search of the internet did not reveal any documents for these countries which are comparable in purpose and content to those analysed, notwithstanding the fact that those analysed still show a significant amount of variation in length, content, detail and analysis.

In analysing these documents, we tried to establish the understanding of threats which need to be addressed by a security strategy. The list of threats reflected in the European Security Strategy itself is relatively short. They are (in that order):

1. Terrorism
2. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
3. Regional conflicts
4. State failure
5. Organised crime

The review of the European Security Strategy undertaken in 2008 changes the emphasis somewhat and lists the following global challenges and key threats (again in this order):

1. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
2. Terrorism and organised crime
3. Cyber security
4. Energy security
5. Climate change

The analysis of the security strategies of Member States shows a much wider range of challenges and threats and the way they are named and/or described varies significantly from one country to another. In some cases, threats were listed in an order of priority and named very succinctly. In others they were described in more narrative ways and it was therefore difficult to compare or even categorise them consistently.

We have identified the following categories of threats or risks or challenges as a result of the analysis of the texts listed in Annex 1:
It is, of course, a rather subjective approach to categorise a whole range of risk or threat descriptions into these categories and it could be argued that some of the specific sub-types would readily fit into more than one category. However, it is nonetheless clear that economic threats are well ahead of other threats as factors in determining the security strategies of Member States of the EU.

A further analysis of the economic threats and the way they are described shows the following:

- Organised crime (in some cases explicitly: transnational)
- Dependence for energy security on other countries (or just a few) or lack of energy resources
- Negative effects of globalisation
- Economic imbalance between developed and developing world - also poverty
- Drugs
- Economic crisis
- Trafficking
- Scarcity of natural resources
- Threats to communication and basic supply lines (specific reference to Gibraltar: Spain)
- Economic tension
- Lack of development in third countries
- Problems of food supply
- Economic pressure
- Foreign ownership of key parts of the economy
- Corruption in the economy (descriptions vary - this is our shorthand)
- Threat to income of population
- Serious disturbance to the functioning of the economy
• Political and economic competition

They are shown here in the order of frequency of their being mentioned in the documents analysed.

It is clear that economic security is tightly bound up with other perceptions of security and is at the heart of thinking of governments in Europe.

The range of threats mentioned under the general heading of arms (again in the order of their frequency):
• Proliferation of WMD
• Proliferations of weapons generally
• Armed conflict in unstable regions on the borders spilling over
• Threats arising from new military technology in the hands of others (asymmetrical)
• Armed threats (along the border)
• Use of military force
• Illegal arms trade
• Ballistic threat
• Armed conflict (generally)

This clearly indicates that the existence of weapons/arms per se (i.e. their proliferation, their illegal trade, and their availability to ‘others’ - especially non-state actors in the form of asymmetrical threat perceptions - is at least as much of a concern as their actual use.

It also clearly indicates that by far the majority of threats identified are non-military or at least only partially or potentially military. This is not always clear cut and there are certainly some threats that are potentially military but not necessarily so. The graph below shows our assessment of the breakdown between military, potentially military and non-military threats among those listed under the broad headings of economic threats and threats related to arms:
If nearly 60% of the threats identified are essentially non-military in nature, then the response to the security environment we find ourselves in should respond to this.

It is interesting to note that in February 2010, the EU published a draft internal Security Strategy which also lists a number of threats. They are (in this order):
1. Terrorism - in any form
2. Serious and organised crime
3. Cyber crime
4. Cross-border crime
5. Violence itself
6. Natural and man-made disasters
7. Road traffic accidents

Clearly none of these is conceived as a military threat.

**What Constitutes National Interests**

The question of national security (and by inference that of European security) is closely connected to the question of what constitutes national (or European) interests. The European Security Strategy (ESS) is silent on the subject in broad terms. One of the few references to European interests (in terms of substance) is the statement: ‘It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed.’

And further on but on the same issue: ‘It is not in

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p. 7
our interest that enlargement should create new dividing lines in Europe. We need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling political problems there.\textsuperscript{5} The review of the ESS is even less explicit on this subject.

It is therefore useful to look at the relevant strategies of the Member States to ascertain their understanding of their own national interests to see whether there is some commonality between them.

Looking at the same documents (listed in Annex 1) there are a long list of national interests reflected in them. As with threats, the way in which national interests are named and/or described varies significantly from one country to another. In total, we have collected some 48 different ways of describing national interests and again, have tried to categorise them in a way that allows for some form of analysis. Not all the documents stated their national security interests.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of national interest</th>
<th>Number of different subtypes</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The existence of the nation state</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability generally</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preservation of values</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic interests</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social stability</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence issues</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power projection of the state</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis resilience</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Existence of the Nation State**

Clearly, ‘the existence of the nation state’ is the most important national interest. The different subcategories mentioned (in the order of the frequency with which they are referred to) included in this broad category are the following:

- Territory 13
- Sovereignty 10
- Independence 8
- Constitutional order 7
- Defence of nationals living abroad 4
- Ensuring that citizens can go about their business safely 3

\textsuperscript{5} Ibid., p. 8
Identity 2
Preservation of National Heritage 2
Security of and access to overseas territory 2
Defending country against armed attack 1
Air and sea ports 1
Ownership of air, sea, land transport infrastructure 1

Stability
Under the next heading: ‘stability generally’ the following subcategories were mentioned:

Stable international order
Critical infrastructure
Peace and prosperity
Global and regional stability
Stability in neighbouring areas
Participating in multilateral crisis management
Open and predictable security policy of all countries in Euro-Atlantic area
Threat to peace and stability in North Western Africa
Cooperation with neighbouring countries - e.g. Baltic States
Expanding area of stability

This covers a broad range of interests and concerns and some of these are far more localised than others and reflect the particular concerns of particular EU Member States linked to their geographical location. What is clear is the perception that stability and therefore security is linked to neighbouring countries and regions and therefore that it is perceived as something that can only be guaranteed if it is realised beyond national boundaries. This gives a clear steer in the direction of collaboration across national borders (and by inference, beyond regional groupings such as the EU). In fact, this reflects a clear perception that a global system of governance that functions would be the single most important factor in fulfilling this national interest.

Values
The next most important range of interests is grouped under the heading of preservation of values. In the sense that this is seen as a national interest there could be the inference that each nation state presumes that its values are unique. However, it is clear, too, that at least as far as the European Union is concerned, there is an understanding that values are shared. This is clearly reflected in the Lisbon Treaty which states:

In the Preamble:
‘Confirming their attachment to the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law’
Article 2

‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.’

On this basis, the formulation of references to values and their preservation in the security strategy texts analysed are quite weak. They are:

- **Basic values**
  - Peace, liberty and prosperity
  - Solidarity and contributing to peace and freedom
  - Freedom and democracy (with specific reference to certain regions in some cases)
  - Respect for human rights and civil liberty

The Lisbon Treaty is far clearer and confirms that these values are shared by all Member States. The questions that arise are:

- Are they also universal? And if so, how does that impact the security perception of the EU and its Member States (i.e. where does the threat to these values come from)?
- If they are universal, in what sense do they represent a ‘national’ interest?
- If these are our values, do we ask ourselves clearly enough whether our lifestyle and our actions limit the ability of others (outside of the EU) to enjoy these freedoms?

**Economic Interests**

Given the importance of economic threats in the threat perception of the EU and its Member States, the **economic interests** identified as national interests in the Member State strategies feature quite low down the list and are quite brief:

- Functioning economy
- Free trade and communications
- Supply of basic resources - energy but also others
- Telecoms security
- Prosperity and World Trade
- Ability of companies to compete globally

There is an implicit contradiction between the perception of economic threats (i.e. the negative effects of globalisation mentioned by eight Member States) and the national interest expressed as the ability of companies to compete globally, prosperity and world trade. In other words, it is a national interest to be able to benefit from globalisation but at the same time it is seen as a threat (because, presumably, others might be able to benefit even more at ‘our’ expense).
Energy Security - a specific example of economic interests

However, it is also clear that at least in some Member States and in the European Security Strategy itself, the issue of access to natural resources (and here oil and gas are the predominant resources of concern) is very high on the list of policy-makers.

The European Security Strategy (2003) has four references to energy, the first featuring in the first paragraph on Global Challenges: ‘And they [developments related to globalisation] have increased European dependence - and so vulnerability - on an interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, information and other fields.’ It goes on to say on the next page: ‘Energy dependence is a special concern for Europe. Europe is the world’s largest importer of oil and gas. Imports account for about 50% of energy consumption today. This will rise to 70% in 2030. Most energy imports come from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa.’

The report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy (2008) has far more reference to energy security and indeed has a whole section devoted to the topic which is quoted below in full:

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Energy Security

Concerns about energy dependence have increased over the last five years. Declining production inside Europe means that by 2030 up to 75% of our oil and gas will have to be imported. This will come from a limited number of countries, many of which face threats to stability. We are faced therefore with an array of security challenges, which involve the responsibility and solidarity of all Member States.

Our response must be an EU energy policy which combines external and internal dimensions. The joint report from the High Representative and Commission in June 2006 set out the main elements. Inside Europe, we need a more unified energy market, with greater inter-connection, particular attention to the most isolated countries and crisis mechanisms to deal with temporary disruption to supply.

Greater diversification, of fuels, sources of supply, and transit routes, is essential, as are good governance, respect for rule of law and investment in source countries. EU policy supports these objectives through engagement with Central Asia, the Caucasus and Africa, as well as through the Eastern Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean. Energy is a major factor in EU-Russia relations. Our policy should address transit routes, including through Turkey and Ukraine. With our partners, including China, India, Japan and the US, we should promote renewable energy, low-carbon technologies and energy efficiency, alongside transparent and well-regulated global markets.

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7 Ibid., p. 3

But neither of these goes so far as to suggest that the EU would use its crisis management tools (that is its civilian or military intervention capabilities) to secure energy supplies.

However, the EU has launched a CSDP mission (Operation Atalanta) in 2008 to ships in the Gulf of Aden from piracy. There is no question about the fact that this operation has at least as one of its objectives to safeguard energy supplies.

Member States, whilst not focusing on energy security as a national interest, are very clear that it is very high on the list of threats.

In the 2007 UK Government Policy Review ‘Britain in the World’, there is a very clear statement that armed forces will be used to secure national interests: It is likely that we will need to use our Armed Forces in both conflict and non-conflict situations when our strategic interests are threatened.9 And in its publication ‘Strategic Trends Programme: Future Character of Conflict’ the UK Ministry of Defence states:

By 2029 there is expected to be a considerable increase in demand for energy. The UK will be critically dependent upon energy imports and securing them will be non-discretionary.10

So there is evidence that at least in one Member State (and this is only by way of example here) there is a clear link between the perception that lack of access to energy is a threat, that access to energy is therefore a national interest and that vital national interests are to be defended if necessary by armed force.

There is no reference here, or anywhere else, to the fact that this dependence on energy is part of a global problem which can only be addressed if those states that are dependent on the overuse of a limited resource, reduce their demand rather than securing their supply at whatever cost.

Defence-related interests

The interests related to defence are interesting in that they are as much about cooperation and control as they are about independence:

Cooperation with NATO and other international organisations (e.g. EU)

Arms control

European defence industry

Independence of own nuclear deterrent

The first of these was mentioned by five Member States; the others by one each. The reference to a European defence industry may be as much about economic factors as it is about independence in this sector.


Is there a geographic aspect to national interests?

As already mentioned above, there is some indication that some of the analysis of threats and interests is connected to geography. Member States with off-shore territory show more interest in maritime communications, Member States with significant borders with non-member states reflect this in their documents to a certain extent. However, there was no clear mention of particular countries or regions that were of particular interest to Member States. It might have been expected that both history (colonial and otherwise) and business interests might shape the geography of national interest but if it does, this is not made explicit.

There are some ways of looking at proxy measures for this, though. One would be the geographic distribution of Embassies of Member States. This shows an interesting picture.

There is significance variance between Member States in terms of the number of Embassies they have in third countries. The graph shows this clearly:

This in itself is, however, no indication of the interest this reveals in specific geographic locations.

A further analysis shows that EU Member States have representations in 152 countries in the world (excluding other EU Member States). In only 47 of these countries are more than half of the EU Member States are represented. The following two graphs show the detailed distribution.
This shows that there are relatively few countries outside of the EU where EU Member States broadly agree that they have enough interest in that geographical location to have an embassy there. The countries which rank highly (i.e. where 15 or more Member States have an Embassy) are:
Another way of looking at the question of which countries rank highly in terms of national interest is the degree to which they feature in news reports in the newspapers of Member States. We have undertaken an analysis of reporting of news from foreign countries across nine Member States for three weeks during November and December of 2009 and January of 2010. This is a snapshot and clearly affected by the current events occupying the headlines of the day. However, this shows a clear trend towards reporting large amounts of news from only a very few countries with very minimal amounts of news from the majority of third countries.
Only one country, the United States of America, makes it to above 15% or even above 10% of the foreign news coverage during three weeks in nine Member States (with a selection of 23 broadsheet newspapers). And of those countries that make it above 1% of the foreign news coverage, most are countries where the business/commercial interests would outweigh any security concerns. The fact that Haiti was on this list and as high up as it is, was the impact of the very serious earthquake there; and the fact that Afghanistan ranked as highly as it did, related mainly to US and EU Member State reassessment of their strategy in Afghanistan. Of course, quite a bit of the news coverage was not directly related to politics or the economy. And there is much more general interest and celebrity news to be had in the USA and in other Western countries.

**Responding to the Threats**

Given this understanding of both threats and national interests that have to be defended, the question arises of how to respond to the threats. Where is the emphasis in the security strategies? Is it an integrated, whole of government approach? Are the tools appropriate for the threats identified?

The European Security Strategy and the European Security Strategy Review are relatively discursive and descriptive. However, it is clear from the texts that the approach is one of intervention. The following quotes illustrate this:
Our traditional concept of self-defence – up to and including the Cold War – was based on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic. The risks of proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will become ever more dangerous. State failure and organised crime spread if they are neglected - as we have seen in West Africa. This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.11

But globalisation has also made threats more complex and interconnected. The arteries of our society - such as information systems and energy supplies - are more vulnerable. Global warming and environmental degradation is altering the face of our planet. Moreover, globalisation is accelerating shifts in power and is exposing differences in values. Recent financial turmoil has shaken developed and developing economies alike.12

The response therefore is then described in the European Security Strategy as:

- **Building Security in the Neighbourhood** - an understanding that security along the borders of the EU is important and that stability in neighbouring states is important. In other words: a focus on those closest to us - notwithstanding the prior assertion that threats can come from anywhere and the knowledge of the potential of modern communications and telecommunications.

- **An international order based on effective multilateralism** - the objective here is the development of a stronger international society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order.

The review of the Security Strategy goes further in that it names enlargement as a continuing driver for stability, peace, and reform. But it also sees the increasing number of crisis management missions as a significant response to the threats faced by the European Union and its Member States. It names the European Neighbourhood Programme as a key pillar of response and singles out the development of an association agreement with the Ukraine and its role in the Middle East Quartet in this context.

The security interests outside the immediate neighbourhood and the link between security and development are reflected less clearly.

What are the responses foreseen in these two documents to the threats and to the pursuance of interests?

There is reference to early action and conflict prevention in both documents as is reference to peace-building and long-term poverty reduction. The European Security Strategy goes so far as to say:

‘...none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means’13

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But at the heart of the response are the following concepts:

**More active**

This concept is intended to focus on the importance of bringing the full range of ‘instruments’ the EU has at its disposal into a strategic framework in response to the identified threats. Here, the document refers to political, diplomatic, military, civilian, trade and development activities. Having said that, the document then discusses the defence budgets of the Member States, the imperative to be able to conduct several missions simultaneously, the will to support UN operations and the need to ensure preventive engagement. In other words, despite the rather wider range of policy tools listed, the focus is on intervention and on military resources.

**More capable**

Here, the focus is on:

- The need to transform the military forces to be more flexible and more mobile, better resourced with those resources used more effectively (clarified in the next paragraph as: “Systematic use of pooled and shared assets would reduce duplications, overheads and, in the medium-term, increase capabilities”)
- Intelligence sharing between Member States
- EU-NATO arrangements

There is reference to civilian and diplomatic capabilities but these are not elaborated as much as the references to military capabilities. References to the use of development and trade instruments to bring about change and lasting peace are not referred to in this section.

The Review of European Security Strategy makes specific reference in this section to the role of the EU Special Representatives, the role of civil society and role of the European Parliament - specifically with regard to election monitoring missions. It speaks more of the role and achievements of the crisis management missions undertaken. There is also reference to combining civilian and military expertise and the necessary command structures.

**More coherent**

This section essentially lists the different instruments available and postulates the need for developing coherence in their use especially in specific geographic situations.

**Working with Partners**

This section focuses on working with the United States of America but also makes reference to the relationship with Russia, and with other emerging economies. There is no reference to the United Nations (UN) in this section.

The Review of the European Security Strategy goes further, listing the Union for the Mediterranean, the Eastern Partnership, the role of the UN and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the WTO.

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14 *ibid*, p. 12
Crisis Management Missions

Much of the focus of the European Security Strategy implementation has been the deployment of crisis management missions. Since the beginning of the European Security and Defence Policy (under which such missions are deployed and which has been renamed Common Security and Defence Policy or CSDP in the Lisbon Treaty), the EU has deployed the following missions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Military/Civilian</th>
<th>Completed/Ongoing</th>
<th>Neighbourhood?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EULEX KOSOVO</td>
<td>Civilian (Rule of Law)</td>
<td>Ongoing since 2008</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMM Georgia</td>
<td>Civilian (Monitoring)</td>
<td>Ongoing since 2008</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL COPPS - Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>Civilian (Police)</td>
<td>Ongoing since 2006</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM - Moldova and Ukraine</td>
<td>Civilian (Monitoring)</td>
<td>Ongoing since 2005</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM Rafah</td>
<td>Civilian (Monitoring)</td>
<td>Ongoing since 2005</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EURFOR Althea - Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Ongoing since 2004</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPM - Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina</td>
<td>Civilian (Police)</td>
<td>Ongoing since 2003</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPAT - FYRO Macedonia</td>
<td>Civilian (Police)</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL PROXIMA - FYRO Macedonia</td>
<td>Civilian (Police)</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUJUST THEMIS - Georgia</td>
<td>Civilian (Rule of Law)</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCORDIA - FYRO Macedonia</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM Somalia</td>
<td>Military Training</td>
<td>Ongoing since 2010</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSSR Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>Civilian/Military</td>
<td>Ongoing since 2008</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUNAVFOR - Atalanta</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Ongoing since 2008</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL - Afghanistan</td>
<td>Civilian (Police and Rule of Law)</td>
<td>Ongoing since 2007</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUJUST LEX - Iraq</td>
<td>Civilian (Rule of Law)</td>
<td>Ongoing since 2007</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL DRC</td>
<td>Civilian (Police)</td>
<td>Ongoing since 2007</td>
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<td>EUSEC DRC</td>
<td>Civilian/Military</td>
<td>Ongoing since 2005</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR Chad/Central African Republic</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support to AMIS II - Sudan/Darfur</td>
<td>Civilian/Military</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUPOL - Kinshasa</td>
<td>Civilian (Police)</td>
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<td>ARTEMIS - DRC</td>
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<td>Completed</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR - DRC</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMM - Aceh</td>
<td>Civilian (Monitoring)</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The very simple count of missions that have been or are being undertaken within the geographical remit of the European Neighbourhood Policy\(^\text{15}\) or within a country identified as a

\(^{15}\) For a list of countries which fall under this policy, please see: [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/partners/index_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/partners/index_en.htm)
potential candidate for accession to the EU (here also counted as neighbourhood), the following graph is illustrative of the fact that whilst the European Security Strategy says there is a focus on the neighbourhood, the reality is that much of the work of missions has gone beyond this geographically.

Furthermore, an analysis of the proportion of missions that have been military in nature, civilian and military, or entirely civilian, also shows a picture that is somewhat different from the words in the ESS where the emphasis is quite clearly on military thinking.
The fact that the EU acts on the whole through civilian missions is something that, whilst at odds with the words of the Strategy, is a positive sign. Is there, though, any evidence that this is shifting over time?

As the graph below shows, there is no trend in that direction at this point.

![CSDP Missions by type and year started](image)

**Policy Responses**

Beyond the interventions which are considered above (which are the most visible element of the European Security Strategy in action – though even they are not very visible) there are a number of other responses the European Union engages in. They can be classified broadly into diplomacy and other policy approaches.

**Diplomacy**

The question of what European Union diplomacy will look like in another 12 months is at this point difficult to predict. The Lisbon Treaty has changed the context somewhat but as yet it is too early to see what will happen.

The current diplomatic approach is characterised by the following:

- The High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) heads this area of EU policy. She (like her predecessor who carried the title High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy) makes regular public statement on foreign policy matters.
- The Foreign Affairs Council (chaired by the HR) meets and reaches conclusions on a wide range of foreign policy matters which are published
- The European Union Special Representatives (EUSR) in certain countries/regions: they are there to represent the European Union, to contribute to the solving of problems, and to be the eyes and ears of the HR. Just over 30 EUSR (some of them succeeding one another in the same location) have been active in a limited number of locations:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number of incumbents</th>
<th>Period(s) covered</th>
<th>Neighbourhood?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>June 1998 to October 1999</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>August 1999 to date</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>June 2001 to date</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>March 1999 to date</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Eastern Europe/Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>May 1999 to December 2004</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Caucasus</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>July 2003 to date</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>March 2005 to date</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>April 1997 to May 2002</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East Peace Process</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>November 1996 to date</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>December 2001 to date</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan/Pakistan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>June 2009 to date</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>July 2006 to date</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis in Georgia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>September 2008 to date</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Lakes Region</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>March 1996 to date</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>July 2005 to date</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Union</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>December 2007 to date</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With the development of the European External Action Service under the Lisbon Treaty, it is not clear whether the EU will continue to have Special Representatives.

**Other Policy Instruments**

Of course this brief review of EU instruments restricts itself to those which relate to the Common Foreign and Security Policy. In addition, there are all the instruments at the disposal of the European Commission in the fields of Development Assistance, External Relations, Enlargement, Neighbourhood Policy, Trade, and other multilateral and bilateral cooperation which contribute to the overall impact of EU foreign policy. From the point of view of resources employed, the broad impact of these may be more significant than the CFSP instruments. But this is not the place to review these.

**The Member States**

Clearly, the Member States have their own foreign policy which also has diplomatic, economic, development, and military components which also contribute to the overall impact the EU has...
as a global actor both on a bilateral basis and in multilateral fora where Member States represent themselves (such as the UN and NATO) and where the EU represents the Member States (such as the WTO).

Security or Peace

It is important to look at the question of what concept of security and peace drives the European Security Strategy and the actions arising from it. As Diana Francis clearly sets out in her recent book ‘From Pacification to Peacebuilding’ there are two very different approaches or models. One starts from a notion of security derived from a sense of interdependence between all people and peoples (and indeed between people and the planet) whereas the other starts from the notion that security is about ‘eat or be eaten’, i.e. a sense that if you don’t win, you lose. The decision of where to start then has significant consequences for the values, the approach to power, to conflict, to change, to international regulation and to what is understood by peace.

One thing that is self-evident in today’s world is that stability is seen as a result of the hegemony of ‘our side’. The fact that the foreign news coverage is so over-dominated by what appears to be an all-consuming interest in the United States is evidence of this. Another is that more often than not decision-makers in Europe (and other parts of the world) will look to Washington for a steer as to how to respond to situations that evolve politically and economically.

The European Security Strategy shows a clear ‘eat or be eaten’ point of departure. It is about how we can keep ourselves safe from terrorism, from WMD (theirs, not ours), from organised crime, state failure, human trafficking (with a destination Europe) and so on. The response is to focus on a ‘ring of stability’ in countries we define as our neighbourhood.

There is no sense in which the strategy (or that of any of the Member States) even begins to ask the questions:

- Do we contribute to insecurity in the world?
- Do we contribute to negative outcomes for people in third countries?

Or, in the words of the 18th century Quaker, John Woolman: ‘May we look upon our treasures, and the furniture of our houses, and the garments in which we array ourselves, and try whether the seeds of war have any nourishment in these our possessions or not’.17

There is some notion of the interdependence of peoples across the globe in the European Security Strategy and in some strategies of Member States. There is recognition that ‘with the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad’.

But this does not translate into an understanding that if there are people anywhere in the world who do not have enough to eat, who do not have somewhere decent to live, who are persecuted, discriminated against, raped, beaten and killed for power and economic gain, there can be no security for anyone. And the fact that Western affluent life-styles contribute

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16 Diana Francis, From Pacification to Peacebuilding, Pluto Press, April 2010


some of the drivers that cause this to happen contributes to our insecurity. In short, we contribute heavily to global insecurity and conflict (directly and indirectly); we spend scandalous amounts of money on military expenditure when 1.02 billion people (or 15% of the world’s population) go hungry every day, when 1.4 billion people (or 21% of the world’s population) live below the poverty line of $1.25 per day.19

Conclusions

There is clear evidence that both decision-makers at the most senior levels in governments and the EU and the media are firmly tied to ‘eat-or-be-eaten’ hegemony thinking when it comes to security. So it is up to citizens, individually but more importantly and effectively in groups (be they NGOs, churches, Quaker Meetings, other faith groups, trade unions or whatever other constellations) to challenge this thinking and to find a way to let our leaders know that we stand for ‘security for the common good’20 which means that we want the political, economic and social agenda to be set by an understanding of interdependence and justice.

We need to challenge decision-makers everywhere and at every turn to rethink their position on the basis that we are no longer prepared to have our so-called security, our comfort, our material possessions, our cars, our energy, and our life-styles ‘safeguarded’ through military means, through nuclear weapons, through exploitative relationships with other countries, through the ruthless exploitation of resources anywhere in the world, and through making common cause with oppressive regimes.

We need to demonstrate our resolve in our practice: how and where we invest our money, how and where we spend our money, how and where we work and live, and by the risk we take every day challenging the routine assumptions that politicians and the media make about our intentions.

We need to show to those citizens of the world whose security is undermined on a daily basis by the acts of our countries and ourselves, that we are willing to change and that we are willing to work for change beyond the individual level.

And we need to start here and today.


Annex 1 - Member State Security and Defence Documents included in the analysis

All papers listed were accessed via the following website: 
http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers.html

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member State</th>
<th>Documents Reviewed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Security and Defence Doctrine - 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>The Modernisation Plan 2000 - 2015 of the Belgian Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>National Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic - 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>The Danish Defence Agreement 2005 - 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>National Security Concept - 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Finnish Security and Defence Policy - 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>French White Paper on Defence and National Security - 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Defence Policy Guidelines - 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>White Paper - 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>White Paper for the Armed Forces - 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>National Security Strategy - date not clear from document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Strategy statement 2008 - 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Strategic Concept - 2004</td>
</tr>
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<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>National Security Strategy - 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Defence Policy Review - 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Netherlands Defence Doctrine - 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland - 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>The National Security Strategy of Romania - 2007</td>
</tr>
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<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic - 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic - 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Strategic Defence Review Comprehensive Summary - 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Defence White Paper - 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Strategic Defence Review - 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>National Defence Directive - 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Summary of ‘Our Military Defence - Commitment and Choices’ - 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism - 2009</td>
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