BRIEFING PAPER

EU Security Research and Peacebuilding – a case of institutional and political disconnect

Contents

1. Introduction

QCEA has done work on the European Security Research Programme for several years; this was focused initially on making the programme better known in order to demonstrate the involvement of the defence industry in the programme.

This paper brings this strand of our work together with research we have undertaken on the security strategies of the European Union and the Member States and on the EU response to terrorism.

We are publishing this paper as a contribution to the discussions taking place in 2011 (and beyond) on the framework programme for research beyond 2014 called Horizon 2020.

The Security Research theme of the 7th Research Framework Programme (applicable from 2007 to 2013 is funded at a level of €1.4 billion out of a at total research budget of € 50.5 billion. Horizon 2020 is set to be much bigger; the figure proposed by the European Commission is € 80 billion. Even if the Security Research Programme stayed at the same proportion of the overall programme it has now, it would see a significant increase in resources; however, it is far more likely that it will absorb a larger proportion of the funding. So the issue of what is done with this money – EU taxpayer's money to be specific – becomes ever more important.

2. European Security Strategies

A programme that spends billions of Euro on security research should be embedded in the security strategy. At EU level, this should focus on the European Security Strategy. However, there are a number of different documents that need to be taken into account for this as there is no one single European Security Strategy that covers the full extent of policy and strategy thinking.

The European Security Strategy 2003 (reviewed in 2008)

The document that carries the name European Security Strategy is the so-called ESS which was drafted and agreed in 2003 and was seen as the EU answer to the events of September 11, 2001 and the US National Security Strategy which was issued in response to these events. It came out of the Common Foreign and Security 'side' of the EU (at the time the so-called 'Second Pillar') and was therefore focused externally. But it also recognised that it is not possible to separate internal and external threats and security issues clearly. In that sense, it made the point that security is indivisible at a global level as well as at any other level.

The threats identified in this strategy were:

- Terrorism
- Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Regional Conflicts
- State Failure
- Organised Crime

This Strategy was reviewed in 2008; the review was not as comprehensive as some had expected and it did not result in a new document; rather, it resulted in Report on Implementation which in part reframed the threat analysis and listed the key threats as:

- Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Terrorism and Organised Crime
- Cyber Crime
- Energy Security
- Climate Change

What is significant about this list is the re-ordering of threats (reflecting a different perception of the priority order), the amalgamation of some of the identified threats from the previous list, the dropping of two of the previously identified threats (though regional conflicts and state failure have hardly disappeared from the face of the earth) and the addition of two new threats: energy security and climate change. This addition, at least, was a welcome change.

The Security Strategies of the Member States

The European Common Foreign and Security Policy is one EU policy which is still intergovernmental. That means that this is a policy area where the Member States work together but where they have not delegated sovereignty to the EU level. That might suggest that the European Security Strategy might reflect the security strategies of the Member States.

We have written elsewhere[1] about the security strategies of the EU Member States and how they compare to the ESS. The graph below shows an analysis of the threats identified in the security strategies of EU Member States.

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[1] QCEA, Be Patterns, Be Examples, 2010, http://www.quaker.org/qcea/peace/rprt-bepatterns-en-aug-2010.pdf, p 27 onwards

Frequency of threats mentioned by Member States by category

Clearly, the threats identified in the ESS and by Member States would lead to two very different research agendas.

The EU Counter Terrorism Strategy (2005)

Unlike the ESS and the Member State Strategies referred to above, this strategy document does not set out its understanding of threats. The threat it addresses is terrorism. Most of the 14 mentions of the word 'threat' in the document relate directly to terrorism.

This strategy is much more focused on the type of response that the EU needs to make to this single threat and identifies 4 pillars of this response which are: Prevent, Protect, Pursue, Respond (in this order).

If these approaches are intended to be the basis of the EU response, then it might also be expected that they would inform the research agenda relating to security.

The EU Internal Security Strategy (2010)

This is a relatively new strategy document and whilst it does not contain a list of threats, it does mention the following threats in the text (in the order in which they appear in the document):

• Trafficking in human beings
• Drugs trafficking
• Terrorism
• Cybercrime
• Cyber attacks on critical infrastructure
• Hostile or accidental releases of disease agents and pathogens
• Sudden flu outbreaks
• Failures in infrastructure

- Health threats

In terms of the response envisaged in this strategy lists the following:

Disrupt international crime networks
Prevent terrorism and address radicalisation
Raise levels of security in cyber space
Strengthen security through border management
Increase Europe's resilience to crises and disasters

So these, too, might contribute to the research agenda even though this document is very recent and therefore the impact may take some time to show in actual projects funded.

3. What is Security?

In assessing whether security research addresses real the security issues of the society it serves it is necessary to consider the question of what is security – or rather, what is seen as security by the society concerned.

To know the answer to that question it is important to understand the paradigm from which we start. There are different ideas of what makes us secure (or safe).

Interdependence or 'Eat or Be Eaten'

I am indebted to Diana Francis, a British Quaker and conflict prevention specialist, for her work on these questions. She identifies two very different world views[2] which are defined by their different points of departure: **either** interdependence **or** 'Eat or be eaten'. The key difference in the two world views are summarize by her in a diagram that sets out the values, the approach to power, reality, and people, the approach to conflict and change, the approach to international relations, and the notions of peace that arise from them.

For the purpose of this discussion key points are:

Notion of security	Interdependence	Eat or be Eaten
Values	No 'us and them'; all are 'us'	'Us' and 'them'
Power	Best achieved and exercised cooperatively	= ability to dominate
People	Never expendable	'May have to be expended'

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[2] Diana Francis, From Pacification to Peacebuilding, A Call to Global Transformation, Pluto Press, April 2010; for more information about this book please consult: http://www.plutobooks.com/display.asp?K=9780745330266&

	Interdependence	Eat or be Eaten
Conflict	Potentially constructive	Needs to be prevented
		Conflict resolution for 'us': so that we can produce what we want
		Conflict resolution for 'them': to secure stability
Approach to international relations	Democratic and principled	Conditional and instrumental
Notions of Peace	Just relationships, mutual care, shared economic and political power and responsibility. Planet as home; constructive conflict culture and systems	Stability and hegemony. Prosperity and power trickle down as by-product. The planet is a resource to be commodified. Conflict has to be controlled with a monopoly on violence

These are two very different world views. The approach we take to building security, to identifying threats, to how we define our interests and how we develop security thinking, methodology, and technology will depend extensively on which of these concepts we embrace.

But only one of these will lead to true security and therefore to peace because security is not divisible; as long as anyone in society – and here we have to talk about society globally – is insecure on any significant level, there will be no true security for anyone.

4. The European Security Research Programme

Research has been taking place within a European context and with European Funding for some time. 2007 – 2013 sees the implementation of the 7th European Research Framework Programme.

The 6th Research Framework Programme, which covered the period 2002 to 2006 did not include any specific theme on security research.

The fact that by 2007 there was a security research theme included in the 7th Framework Programme resourced at a significant level with € 1.4 billion for 7 years, needs a bit of explaining. We will then go on to analyse what it has done to date.

How it came about

Although it has been argued that the impetus for this programme (as for much of the 'security agenda' in the EU) were the terrorist attacks of September 2001, the first discussions around security and a potential security research programme can be traced back to July 2001 when the **EU Advisory Group on Aerospace** was created. This included:

- Five European Commissioners
- Two Members of the European Parliament
- One representative of the Council of the European Union (Javier Solana, the then High Representative for Foreign Policy)

- Seven representatives from industry, all of whom were either the Chairmen or the CEO of their companies: SNECMA, EADS (2), BAE Systems, Finmeccanica, Thales, and Rolls-Royce.[3]

This was followed by the so-called **Group of Personalities**, a group which formed itself around the intent to introduce security research into the Research Framework Programme. It included:

- Two European Commissioners (Research, Information Society)
- Eight representatives from industry, again at the level of Chairmen or CEO (BAE Systems, EADS, Thales, Finmeccanica, Ericsson, Indra, Siemens and Diehl); the defence industry had been joined by the IT industry.
- Seven research institutes of which at least two appear to be linked directly to Member State Ministries of Defence
- Four MEPs (2 Christian Democrat, 1 Socialist, 1 Liberal)
- Seven observers including Javier Solana, two further European Commissioners (External Relations and Trade), and representatives from the Western European Armaments Organisations (WEAO), the Organisation conjointe de cooperation en matiere d'armament (OCCAR), the European Space Agency and NATO.[4]

This group produced a set of recommendations[5]. Astonishingly, a Commission Decision of February 2004 entitled 'Commission Decision on the implementation of the Preparatory Action on the Enhancement of the European industrial potential in the field of security research 2004-2006'[6] established an initial pilot project which essentially put in place the recommendations from the Group of Personalities prior to their inclusion in a future Research Framework Programme. The decision did not specify the amount of money that would be available but the money spent on the Preparatory Action was, in the end much lower than that recommended by the Group of Personalities who had called for at least € 1 billion per annum.

Vested interests

The European Commission established the European Security Research Advisory Board (ESRAB). On The Commission website we read the following:

> 'Following one of the recommendations of the Group of Personalities report, ESRAB was formed in April 2005 and signalled Europe's intent to make a significant contribution towards addressing security research and technology needs. It brought together demand articulators and research and technology suppliers in a 50-person-strong board of high-level specialists and strategists with expertise in the field of security research including: public authorities, industry, research institutes and specialist think tanks. In addition, five Members of the European Parliament and representatives from 14 European Commission services participated in the workings of the board. This report, the board's principal output, represents the work of more than 300 people.'[7]

Looking at the membership of ESRAB reveals that among the 50 members of this group are representatives from among others Finmeccanica, EADS, THALES, and BAE Systems. These were not the only representatives of

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[3] Ben Hayes, Arming Big Brother, Transnational Institute, 2006, accessed on 8 July 2011 at:
http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/bigbrother.pdf, pp 9-10

[4] *ibid*, pp 14-15

[5] European Commission, Research for a Security Europe, 2003, accessed on 8 July 2011 at:
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/security/files/doc/gop_en.pdf

[6] Official Journal of the European Union, Commission Decision, 5.3.2004, accessed on 8 July 2011 at:
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:067:0018:0022:en:PDF

[7] European Commission website, Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry, accessed on 8 July 2011 at:
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/security/industrial-policy/research-agenda/index_en.htm#h2-2

industry and not the only representatives of the defence industry. But they are the 'big four' and they were all involved in the Group of Personalities.

What has been funded

So then let us look at what has been funded from the programmes.

Under the Preparatory Action from 2004 to 2006 the projects funded can be analysed under the following headings:

**Preparatory Action - Number and Percentage of Projects by Category**

An analysis of some 40 projects funded under this mechanism shows the breakdown into different categories of project types. What is clear is that there was a **significant focus on technology** (surveillance, detection, protection, border controls) and that there was **rather less focus** on the social policy aspects of security policy.

The development of the agenda for future research also absorbed a reasonable proportion of the programme. In other words, organisations – including industry – were funded by the EU to set the agenda for the funding they would be able to access for the coming 7 years.

A similar analysis of the first 118 projects funded under the European Security Research Programme (all those published up to and including 10 June 2011) shows a similar picture.

European Security Research Programme - Categories of Projects Funded to June 2011

This is my analysis of the European Security Research Programme using a similar set of categories to those used above – expanded to cover the wider range of projects. The 'other' category includes: Data mining technology and methodology; personal protection technology; social policy issues; anti-counterfeiting technology; policing; and preventive technology.

Technology continues to take centre stage. There is some –social policy and security policy research. The agenda of the defence industry is all too apparent in this programme. Policing related projects have reduced significantly (from 15% of projects under the PASR to 1% under ESRP).

The extent to which the projects funded are linked to the threats identified in any of the strategies or groups of strategies that might inform this project is, at least, questionable. Some are being addressed: terrorism, organised crime and cyber crime are – arguable – addressed at least in part by surveillance technology, protection of infrastructure and other detection technology. Weapons of mass destruction (defined here as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) are addressed by some of the projects. Under PASR this was the case in 8 projects representing some € 16.5 m (or 25% of the total project costs funded); under ESRP – and despite the fact that weapons of mass destruction had risen to place one on the European Security Strategy list of threats – this had reduced to around 5% of the programme, but still covers 9 projects and € 33 m worth of spending.

But what is far more worrying is that other threats – both those identified in the various strategies and the broader social issues which would need to be addressed if we started from a different security paradigm – are not addressed at all here. The kinds of research that would or could address those would be much more in the context of social science, social policy research, economics, peacebuilding, conflict prevention, environmental sciences and energy efficiency.

There are, of course, other programmes in the FP7 framework and some of these issues are addressed in some of them. However, the extent to which projects in those areas do - or do not – address security concerns in the broadest sense of this word, is something that is certainly not clear-cut.

Who has been funded

We have tried to identify the history of the security research agenda and at least hint at the security paradigm that supports the agenda that has been set. We have also tried to look at the interests that has shaped the agenda and the types of research that has been funded.

The final piece in the puzzle is to look at who has actually been funded. This is easy at one level; harder at a more detailed one.

The European Commission publishes[8] basic details of all research projects it funds. The published information includes:

- The details of the lead organisation and contact details for the project coordinator in the lead organisation;
- A short project description
- The Project acronym
- The Project reference number
- The start and end dates
- The duration in months
- The total project costs
- The EU contribution to the project (project funding)
- The type of project (EU categorisation)
- The partners in the project – organisation name and country

What it does not show is the distribution of the funds between project partners and the specific area of expertise contributed by each project partner.

All of the analysis referred to above is based on this published information.

There is, thus, reasonably clear information about who is involved in the projects and who leads them.

Looking at the involvement in projects on the part of the key players in the defence industry shows that having been involved in the development of the programme from the earliest days has certainly had an impact.

The EU – under current rules – is not in a position to fund military research; the security research programme – both under PASR and under FP7 were thus framed as addressing homeland security threats. Is it then surprising to find involvement of defence industry companies in a significant number of projects:

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[8] See: http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/projects_en.html for details (searchable database).

Some key arms companies in ESRP

When discussing this with officials from the European Commission who have an involvement in the management of the programme, the response tends to be: the defence industry has the expertise because they make the weapons against which we have to defend ourselves for our security. But that is rather a circular argument. If we allow the security agenda to be defined in terms of the 'eat or be eaten' paradigm of power over others, of 'us' and 'them', and we allow the very companies that profit from the sale (and thus the manufacture) of the tools of destruction to set the agenda for security research, then the agenda we have is the agenda we should expect.

But we can do better than this.

Conclusions and Recommendations

As the discussions about Horizon 2020 – the next Research Framework Programme – develop, we need to ask some questions, and we need to answer them:

1.   Which security paradigm do we want?

2.   Which security paradigm does the EU by its very nature demonstrate?

3.   Given this history, can we use our experience to ensure that the EU contributes to a world where interdependence globally informs our policy choice?

The financial framework of the Security Research Programme within Horizon 2020 is not yet fixed; it could be a significant amount of money exceeding € 3 billion over 7 years. Do we want to continue to through this money at technology and an ever increasing restriction of privacy? Or do we want to spend at least some of it on exploring the root causes of insecurity in the world and how to address them and, more to the point, the contribution the EU can make to addressing them.

Security research must focus far more on the prevention aspects of the counter terrorism agenda but from the perspective of finding answers to the question of why people want to engage in terrorism and crime in the first place and how to prevent that impulse, rather than preventing them from actually committing such acts when they are already a long way down that path. We therefore recommend that under Horizon 2020 the European Union should:

- Allocate a proportion of the security research budget to the social policy agenda we so urgently need: security research that addresses the social dimensions of security and insecurity, the issue of whether or not people feel that they have an investment in their society – locally, nationally, regionally, or globally; we would recommend 25% of the total amount allocated to security research;

- Ensure in the formulation and framing of Horizon 2020 that the different strands of the programme (such as social sciences and humanities, environment, energy, etc) inform the security research agenda without being overtaken by it. It is, however, important to ensure that there are separate programmes covering social sciences and humanities, environment, energy, etc) to allow for such synergy, avoid confusion and ensure that these very important areas are not sidelined or securitised.

- Ensure that the references to ethics in Horizon 2020 go much further than the references to ethics in FP7 and include conflict sensitivity and matters of privacy, protection of vulnerable groups, and the inclusion in civil society in the assessment of the compliance with ethics requirements;

- Ensure that adherence to the Charter of Fundamental Rights – not just of the research projects themselves, but also of the organisations that carry out the research – is legally binding on participating organisations.