Military Responses to Energy Security Problems:

What role for Common Security and Defence Policy?

The Quaker Council for European Affairs
Produced by the Quaker Council for European Affairs (QCEA)

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The Quaker Council for European Affairs (QCEA) was founded in 1979 to promote the values of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) in the European context. Our purpose is to express a Quaker vision in matters of peace, human rights, and economic justice. QCEA is based in Brussels and is an international, not-for-profit organisation under Belgian Law.

Publication date: November 2010
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Foreword

This report is part of a programme of work which QCEA has been undertaking since 2008. The programme focuses on different aspects of EU policy with regard to energy security and climate change and aims to advocate on responses to these challenges which are based on respect for human rights, economic justice, conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

Quakers (amongst others) are committed to lifestyle simplicity and are concerned about the global distribution of resources and the ecological impact of resource use. Quakers, too, are known for their longstanding commitment to peace and conflict prevention.

This report looks at the military responses to energy security through that lens, arguing that significant changes to demand for energy - based on lifestyle change on the part of the developed economies - are the only sustainable solution to the challenges of climate change and energy security. It is based on an understanding that security (and that includes energy security) is indivisible, that all people in this world are interdependent and that we are all interdependent with the ecosystem we inhabit.

So long as energy security is seen only from the perspective of maintaining the lifestyles of the developed world at whatever cost to others, military responses will be inevitable, leading to more conflict. But in the long term neither do such responses ultimately achieve the goal of energy security for the developed world.
Summary

EU Member States have taken part in military missions with energy security components for many years, through NATO, in support of US-led actions and independently. EU militaries contributed to US interventions Operation Earnest Will at the tail-end of the Iran-Iraq war and the 1991 and 2003 Gulf Wars. Britain, the EU’s largest military power, has recently used its navy to defend energy infrastructure in the Middle East and to train the Nigerian military to protect oil production and exports. Both Britain and France are seeking to enhance their expeditionary military capabilities, in part to protect the supply of key strategic resources such as oil. NATO, an institution which overlaps with the EU, has been promoting its potential role in coordinating military responses to energy security problems over recent years. The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has not yet articulated a clear position on this issue. However, the EU’s first naval mission, Operation Atalanta, is already performing an energy security role by combating Somali pirates who have hijacked a number of giant oil tankers since 2008.

As the EU’s dependence on imported fossil fuels increases, it may become increasingly attractive to launch CSDP military missions in response to energy supply security problems, both to protect supply and to develop the military dimension of CSDP in a low-risk, low-cost context. Crude oil is an internationally-traded and strategic commodity crucial to the functioning of all EU economies, and security threats to oil supply could prove a particularly galvanising force for unanimity between EU Member States in decisions around CSDP missions. The EU’s dependence on oil and gas imports from unstable regions like West Africa and the Middle East is growing. The EU is considering investing in the proposed Trans-Sahara gas pipeline (TSGP) which would source gas from the troubled Niger Delta. The dire humanitarian and conflict situation in that region implies that the EU will need to consider a security response to protect the pipeline if it is built.

Unless the EU takes steps to reduce oil and gas demand across the Member States, the pressure to respond militarily to protect seaborne oil shipments and to invest in risky, morally-compromised fossil fuel projects will remain.

Key Recommendations

- The EU should put forward a range of new measures to substantially reduce oil and gas demand across the Member States. Incremental, year by year reduction targets should be set. At a minimum the EU should implement the January 2009 recommendations of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) which call for European oil demand to be reduced ‘by at least 50 percent by 2050 and probably much more’1. To achieve this, the EU will need to address oil use in all sectors of the economy, with particular focus on housing, transport, retail, and agriculture. Demand reduction will also usefully contribute towards greenhouse gas emission reduction targets.

- The EU should develop further its role in making clear the important role of lifestyle choices in reducing oil and gas use. It should commit to setting a behavioural example through the working practices of the EU Institutions. This could be done by significantly reducing air travel, minimising energy use in EU buildings and introducing local, organic food in canteens and restaurants. High profile media campaigns should be launched stressing the value of reduced personal energy use in combating climate change and building energy security. The EU’s annual Sustainable Energy Week in Brussels should include seminars on lifestyle issues, and showcase

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the work of community groups such as the Transition Network\(^2\) and Aufbruch\(^3\). The EU could also provide funding to community groups supporting lifestyle change.

- The EU should abandon its support of the Trans-Sahara gas pipeline, acknowledging the grave security risks to the project and the dire humanitarian situation in the Niger Delta which the project could exacerbate.

- The EU should not treat Operation Atalanta as a benchmark for future CSDP interventions to protect oil shipments and should recognise that such missions can do little to contribute towards long-term energy security.

\(^2\) [http://www.transitionnetwork.org/](http://www.transitionnetwork.org/)

\(^3\) [http://www.anders-besser-leben.de/](http://www.anders-besser-leben.de/)
Introduction

As the EU’s domestic production of oil and gas declines, its dependence on imports from unstable regions such as the Middle East and West Africa increases. Despite its ambitious renewable energy targets, the EU will remain dependent on oil and gas for many years to come and thus vulnerable to supply disruptions and price shocks. The tight global oil supply and demand situation increases the impact of supply disruptions and price increases caused by terrorism, piracy and conflict. At the same time, the EU is keen to develop the military dimension of CSDP as an independent force which can protect EU interests. In light of this, it could become increasingly attractive for the EU to gear CSDP military missions towards protection of key energy infrastructure and seaborne shipments of fossil fuels. Naval missions to deter pirate attacks against oil tankers would, in particular, represent a low-cost, low-risk way to perform an energy security function, while developing the military dimension of CSDP.

EU Member States have acquiesced to and sometimes actively supported US military responses to energy security problems. EU countries took part in US-led Operation Earnest Will during the Iran-Iraq War, and the 1991 and 2003 Gulf Wars. The US has pursued military dominance in the Middle East in large part to ensure secure delivery of oil from that region and to repel any states that might seek to dominate the hydrocarbon resources of the region. The US is now expanding its military capability in and around Africa, in part to protect oil shipments from West Africa. EU Member States may again play supporting roles in US-led actions in the Middle East and beyond. CSDP, however, has not articulated a clear position on potential military responses to energy security problems. NATO, an institution which overlaps with the EU, has taken the lead in this area, publicly discussing its role in this field, building on several NATO naval missions with energy security components which have already been launched. Meanwhile, British and French defence policies seek to expand expeditionary capacity partly to protect key strategic resources such as oil. The EU’s ongoing anti-piracy mission Operation Atalanta is an interesting test case for the future development of potential CSDP military responses to energy security problems. The mission represents an attempt by the EU to boost CSDP as an instrument which can serve EU economic and strategic interests with direct military force. Energy security factors play a part in the mission, which is taking place off the coast of Somalia, where pirates have successfully hijacked a number of giant oil tankers since 2008.

It remains unclear, however, how CSDP’s approach to this issue will develop. Member States must arrive at a unanimous decision for a CSDP mission to be launched, which indicates that CSDP may not be ideally suited to rapid deployment of expeditionary forces in many circumstances. The failure of the EU to intervene militarily in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2008, for instance, was down to a lack of consensus among Member States. The need for energy supply security, however, could constitute a common interest that would help build consensus on CSDP military deployments. Oil security, in particular, will often cut across individual national interests, as oil is an internationally traded commodity on which all EU Member States depend. When oil supply security is threatened, EU interests will often overlap with other great powers. Ships from the US, Russia, China and the EU have all found common purpose in the fight against Somali piracy which threatens the security of oil and other shipments. Such alignment of great power interests could occur where oil shipments are threatened at sea in the Persian Gulf or the Gulf of Guinea (see

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Section 4), or when oil and gas infrastructure is threatened by militia attack in the Niger Delta or terrorist attack in the Middle East.

CSDP is a multifaceted policy incorporating both civilian and military approaches which recognises the need to reduce sources of conflict and address peacebuilding and poverty reduction. However, mitigating the sources of conflict which threaten fossil fuel supply security, whether in the Niger Delta, Somalia, or elsewhere, will require complex, dedicated long-term work with no guarantees of success. The demands of secure oil and gas supply are ongoing and immediate. The EU hopes to augment its gas supply by investing in the Trans-Sahara gas pipeline (TSGP). The proposed pipeline is intended to source gas from the Niger Delta, a conflict zone in which pollution from the hydrocarbons industry has ruined agricultural land and fisheries, causing widespread poverty. The Niger Delta’s most prominent militia group, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has already announced its intention to sabotage TSGP. This implies that the EU will need to consider its role in providing security provision for the pipeline.

Energy supplies will continue to be disrupted as a result of underlying political and social problems in many parts of the world for many decades to come, and the situation may get worse with the impact of climate change and growing scarcity of world energy resources. Naval missions to protect energy infrastructure and shipments, and the training of military forces in oil and gas producing countries represent relatively low-risk, low-cost ways to employ European militaries and contribute towards increased short-term supply security. The surest way to diminish EU involvement in such missions, and to render unnecessary EU support for risky, morally-compromised fossil fuel projects like TSGP, is for the EU to focus its efforts on substantially and rapidly reducing demand for oil and gas.

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5 Deteriorating security conditions in the Niger Delta could prompt a CSDP response, especially if the EU finances the proposed Trans-Sahara gas pipeline, a project at high risk of sabotage from militant groups (see Section 5). The EU could offer training and financial support to the Nigerian military, whose human rights record would make any such support controversial.

1 EU Energy Security – The Oil and Gas Situation

The world faces unprecedented challenges to produce enough energy to meet demand over the coming years. The International Energy Agency (IEA) were stark in their 2008 World Energy Outlook when they stated that ‘current global trends in energy supply and consumption are patently unsustainable’\(^7\). The IEA predicts 1.5 percent annual growth in global energy demand up to 2030, driven mainly by the rising economies of Asia and the Middle East\(^8\). In 2030 fossil fuels will continue to dominate the world’s energy mix. The IEA forecast suggests that, to meet projected global demand, capital investment of $1.1 trillion annually will be necessary\(^9\). The economic crisis has, however, led to plunging investment in new energy projects, with numerous delays and cancellations affecting oil, gas and renewables. Continued lack of investment is likely to lead to price surges in a few years as rising demand hits stagnant supply.

At the same time as the world faces major challenges in producing enough energy, the EU’s domestic fossil fuel production is in rapid decline, leaving the Union increasingly dependent on imports. The EU currently imports 86 percent of the oil it consumes\(^10\), around half of this from Russia and Norway. A further 20 percent of the EU’s imported oil comes from the Middle East, with 15 percent coming from Africa. By 2030, 95 percent of the oil Europe consumes will be imported\(^11\). The EU will become increasingly dependent in imports from unstable regions like the Middle East and West Africa. EU natural gas consumption is forecast to rise to 771 billion cubic metres (bcm) by 2030\(^12\), up from current levels around 500 bcm\(^13\). As with oil, domestic EU production of gas is in decline, with 2020 production expected to be 39 percent below 2005 levels\(^14\). Imports make up 60 percent of current EU gas consumption. This is expected to rise to 84 percent by 2030\(^15\).

The IEA recognises that oil will remain ‘the world’s vital source of energy’ for the foreseeable future ‘even under the most optimistic of assumptions about the pace of development and deployment of alternative technology’\(^16\). Increased oil use will be driven by growth in the transport sector, which will push global oil demand to 105 million barrels per day (m/bpd) from today’s level of 85 m/bpd\(^17\). Global transport and food systems depend on oil, as do the plastics and chemicals industries. Oil is a uniquely energy-dense substance. The average full car petrol tank holds the energy equivalent of two years of human labour. At current levels of consumption, the work done globally by oil is equivalent to 22 billion human slaves working non-stop round the clock\(^18\). Europe, like the rest of the industrialised world, is heavily dependent on oil. Even if the EU succeeds in its

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\(^11\) ibid, p. 19
\(^13\) BP, Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2008, p. 27
plan to source 10 percent of its transport fuel from renewable sources by 2020, the EU’s transport will still be over 80 percent reliant on oil.\textsuperscript{19}

**Box 1 - EU Oil Vulnerability** - Without oil, transport and supply networks grind to a halt, and products - from food to pharmaceuticals - fail to reach shop shelves. Supply disruptions are capable of crippling a modern economy, as demonstrated by the fuel protests which have occurred across Europe over the last ten years. Large-scale protests against rising fuel prices were mounted by truckers in Belgium, France and the UK in September 2000, exposing the vulnerability of modern economies to oil supply disruptions. The UK protests were particularly effective in bringing the country to the brink of shutdown. Truckers blockaded oil refineries around Britain, preventing tankers from leaving to deliver supplies to petrol stations. Within days, panic buying in supermarkets emptied store shelves. Britain was said by one commentator to be ‘nine meals from anarchy’, referring to the fact that UK supermarkets only store around 3 days worth of food supply at any one time. The Chief Executive of UK supermarket chain Sainsburys wrote to Prime Minister Tony Blair warning him that food stocks would be depleted within days if the blockades continued. Some supermarkets began rationing bread and milk. Petrol stations began to close, and ambulance services warned the government that they were nearly out of fuel. The government considered whether to call in the military to deal with the protest and enable petrol deliveries to be made, before the protests dissipated about a week after they began. Similar problems occurred in Spain and Portugal following the truckers’ blockades in 2008. Such protests have highlighted how dependent our economies are on an uninterrupted supply of oil, and underline the need for the implementation of demand reduction measures (see Section 6).

Governments are keenly aware of the economic impact of oil price spikes. Global recessions followed oil price increases in 1973-74, 1978, 1980 and 1990, and the unprecedented oil price spike of 2008 was an important factor in turning an economic slowdown into a recession.\textsuperscript{20} While oil price spikes prior to 2008 were the result of deliberate politically-motivated supply cuts and geopolitical instability, the 2008 price surge was in large part the result of booming demand and insufficient supply.\textsuperscript{21} Global oil production has struggled to keep up with demand over recent years with a concomitant effect on price. Things were very different in 1999, when the oil price slumped to $9 a barrel. Less than ten years later, the oil price hit a record $147 in July 2008. The price spike and economic troubles collapsed demand and by December 2008 the price was down to $32. As demand slowly picked up in 2009, so has the price, which is steady at around $80 at the time of writing. Such price volatility is unsurprising in a tight supply and demand situation. If demand rises, and supply cannot satisfy demand, prices rise, and eventually reach levels which begin to destroy demand, leading to a price collapse. Unless supply can begin to increase to match or exceed growing demand, then the cycle repeats itself. Many analysts predict that we are heading for


another oil shock before 2015\textsuperscript{22} and that an ultimate global production peak is likely to occur before 2020\textsuperscript{23}. A tight supply and demand situation leaves the world particularly vulnerable to supply disruptions. Oil is an internationally traded commodity, and supply disruptions anywhere impact the price of oil everywhere. With little spare oil production capacity in the system, physical disruptions to supply in one part of the world cannot be easily offset by increasing production elsewhere. This situation enhances the impact of attacks by militant groups, terrorists or pirates on energy supplies. Some analysts suggest that the risk of terror attacks on energy infrastructure is adding around $10 - $15 to the price of a barrel of oil on the international market\textsuperscript{24}. Pipelines carry 40 per cent of the world’s oil supply and have long been a target of militant groups in Nigeria, Columbia and Chechnya. Since 2003, there have been hundreds of attacks on oil pipelines in Iraq. Although pipelines can be repaired within weeks, frequent attacks can substantially reduce production. In Nigeria, sustained attacks on energy infrastructure have reduced production by about a third, at a cost of $1 billion a month in lost revenue to oil companies and the government\textsuperscript{25}. In addition, it is well understood by terror groups that attacks on energy infrastructure can undermine social and economic stability and affect world oil supply and prices. Osama Bin Laden has frequently encouraged terror groups to target oil infrastructure\textsuperscript{26}. In February 2006 a suicide bomb attack on the Saudi oil facility at Abqaiq failed to significantly damage the target but news of the attempt caused jitters on the international market leading to an instant 3.4 per cent increase in the oil price\textsuperscript{27}.

The remaining 60 per cent of the world’s oil is transported by sea, and much of this oil must pass through high-risk bottlenecks in the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Aden and Strait of Malacca to reach its destination. A major al-Qaeda attack on the oil tanker MV Limburg in 2002 killed one crew member and led to 90,000 barrels of oil leaking into the sea\textsuperscript{28}. The threat to seaborne oil has escalated since 2008, with increasing numbers of attacks on oil tankers by Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean (see Section 3 - Operation Atalanta).

\textsuperscript{22} Looming supply constraints, as well as the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, highlight the importance of introducing measures to reduce oil demand (see Section 5).
\textsuperscript{25} Financial Times, ‘Nigeria attack forces Shell to cut output’, 31 January 2010, accessed 10 June 2010, available at \url{http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ef301ff2-0ecf-11df-bd79-00144feabdc0.html}
\textsuperscript{26} Lawrence, Bruce (ed), Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden, (London: Verso, 2005)
2 Energy Security: The Military Dimension

2.1 United States

President Jimmy Carter’s 1980 State of the Union address established an era of US militarism in the Middle East specifically designed to maintain US influence over oil supply in the region. The so-called Carter Doctrine established in that speech followed a decade of increasing US reliance on imported oil and weakening US influence in the oil-rich Middle East. US domestic oil production peaked in 1971 and oil imports steadily increased during the 1970s. By 1977 the US was importing 45 per cent of its oil needs. The Middle East was already well established as the world’s most important oil producing region. America’s influence in the region had been strong with a loyal client state in Iran under the Shah and historic ties to the biggest oil producer Saudi Arabia dating back to 1945. The 1973 Arab oil embargo and subsequent Saudi nationalisation of its oil concessions, previously controlled by US companies, weakened the American position in the region. US power was further diminished by the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79, which saw the US lose its ally and the Shah replaced with a government hostile to American interests. With Iraq already allied to the Soviet Union, the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 provoked fear in Washington that Russia might be in a position to usurp its leading position in the region. US ability to intervene if attempts were made to force Saudi Arabia into the Soviet sphere was limited. The US response was to begin building an extensive military presence in the region, and to issue a threat to all who sought to undermine its primacy over Middle Eastern oil. Carter’s 1980 declaration noted ‘the overwhelming dependence of the Western democracies on oil supplies from the Middle East’ and that Russia ‘poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil’. Crucially, Carter asserted that ‘an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.’

Only five weeks after these words were delivered, Carter established the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force in Florida to oversee security in the Persian Gulf. Under Ronald Reagan, the Task Force became US Central Command (Centcom) and was significantly expanded. By 1983, America was able to deploy a substantial ground force in the Middle East on just two days’ notice. Reagan oversaw a Centcom which controlled 100,000 troops, 50,000 marines and Air Force and Naval personnel. In 1987, America’s new military capacity in the region was put to use during the ‘tanker war’ phase of the Iran-Iraq War. Both Iran and Iraq began launching attacks on neutral oil tankers in the Persian Gulf, actions which restricted the flow of Gulf oil supplies to the rest of the world. The United States’ Navy began providing escorts to Kuwaiti tankers, and retaliated when Iran attacked these ships. For the first time, the US was comprehensively asserting its military power to protect oil supplies in the region. European nations also took part in Operation Earnest Will, with Britain, France and the Netherlands contributing ships to the mission.

By the time of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the US was capable of deploying a massive military machine to protect oil supplies in the Gulf region. 350,000 US troops, 2000 tanks and 1400 tactical aircraft were deployed to repel Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait. Operation Desert Storm

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proved to be the fullest manifestation of the spirit of the Carter doctrine to date and an ideal testing ground for the superpower’s new capability. Unlike the 2003 Iraq conflict, in 1990 there was no ambiguity from the US leadership that oil was a key motivation. By invading Kuwait, Saddam Hussein controlled 20 per cent of the world’s oil reserves. President George Bush feared that Saddam would also invade Saudi Arabia and thereby effectively become the dominant oil power in the world. Bush was clear that ‘our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom and the freedom of friendly countries around the world would all suffer if control of the world’s great oil reserves fell into the hands of Saddam Hussein’. US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney said that by occupying Kuwait, Saddam was ‘in a position to be able to dictate the future of worldwide energy policy’.

Following a decisive victory in the Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US was able to shift Cold War deployments to the Gulf where they manned bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and Saudi Arabia. During the Clinton years, air bases in Saudi Arabia were used in the enforcement of no-fly zones in southern Iraq, part of the containment strategy to keep Iraq weak and unable to mount a credible threat to the oil-rich states on its borders. Towards the end of the Clinton administration, the neoconservative pressure group Project for the New American Century (PNAC), whose supporters included Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney, wrote to Clinton urging him to take military action to topple Saddam Hussein. They claimed that the Iraqi leader presented a serious threat to ‘a significant portion of the world’s supply of oil’. The letter goes on to suggest that America ‘should establish and maintain a strong U.S. military presence in the region, and be prepared to use that force to protect our vital interests in the Gulf’. The PNAC letter called for an intensification of the Carter Doctrine, one that would include pre-emptive protection of the region’s oil supplies. Once in the White House PNAC supporters such as Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz and Donald Rumsfeld swiftly put regime change in Iraq on the agenda. The 2003 invasion of Iraq was made possible by the oil-motivated militarisation of the Middle East and is in part the product of both the Carter Doctrine and Bush Doctrine of pre-emptive strikes.

The US militarisation of oil security in the Middle East has been largely acquiesced to and sometimes actively supported by EU Member States. Fourteen EU Member States contributed troops to the multi-national force involved in the invasion and occupation of Iraq 2003, and numerous European countries were involved in the 1991 intervention and the earlier Operation Earnest Will. The defence policies of two key EU Member States, Britain and France, are developing towards expeditionary capabilities well suited to missions protecting oil supply. As they have in the past, EU Member States may again support US oil security missions in the future. Beyond the Middle East, the US is now securitising the oil resources of Africa in anticipation of imports from West Africa becoming its biggest source of foreign oil in the years to come. Operational since October 2008, US Africa Command (AFRICOM) is the first US military command centre specifically designed to coordinate US military activities on the continent. AFRICOM’s official raison d’être is to help build ‘a more stable environment in which political and economic growth can take place’ and ‘to build regional security and crisis-response capacity in support of US government efforts in Africa’. The

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36 Yetiv, Crude Awakenings, pp. 65-70
Bush administration identified secure access to African oil as a ‘strategic national interest’ and AFRICOM has made clear that securing African oil production and exports is one of its chief missions. Forecasts suggest that 25 per cent of US oil imports could come from Africa by 2015, a larger quantity even than from the Persian Gulf. As Africa’s largest oil producer, Nigeria is crucial to US oil security, supplying 10 per cent of US imports. The US provides financial assistance and training to the Nigerian military and has worked on boosting the maritime capabilities of the Nigerian military in the Niger Delta and off the coast to protect oil installations and shipments. The US Navy carries out patrols in the Gulf of Guinea, a crucial shipping area for oil exports (see Section 4). Secretary of State Hillary Clinton indicated on her visit to the country in August 2009 that US military support to Nigeria would be stepped up (See Section 5 for further discussion on the security situation in the Niger Delta).

2.2 NATO

NATO discussion around its potential role in coordinating military responses to energy security problems has only recently picked up momentum. For many years NATO had focused on its own institutional energy security through the maintenance of its Cold War era pipeline system, designed to ensure that NATO’s requirements for petroleum products and their distribution can be met at all times. The broader significance of energy security was raised in NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept which states that the disruption of the flow of vital resources is an important security issue for the Alliance, alongside terrorism, organised crime and territorial threats to Member States. A NATO workshop on energy security took place in London in January 2004, and the Bush administration prioritised the issue at Alliance meetings in early 2006. NATO Member governments agreed at the Riga Summit in November 2006 that NATO should consider what shape a collective response to energy security issues might take. By the April 2008 Bucharest Summit, Member States had agreed on a set of priority areas in which NATO could add value in the field of energy security. Senior NATO personnel have since elaborated on these priority areas, placing emphasis on the possible role of the Alliance in protecting critical energy infrastructure and supply routes.

NATO recognises that growing EU and US dependence on imported fossil fuels means increasing dependence on foreign energy infrastructure. Former NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer noted particular risks to oil and gas pipelines in the Niger Delta and the Southern Caucasus, where the August 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia threatened key oil and gas infrastructure supplying the West. A 2008 NATO Parliamentary Assembly report noted threats to energy infrastructure from four sources: terrorists (al-Qaeda in the Middle East, the Parti Karkerani Kurdistan/Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) in Turkey); pirates (Somalia, South East Asia); the

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consequences of interstate warfare (Russia-Georgia); and insurgent groups (Nigeria, Columbia)\textsuperscript{46}. NATO suggests a number of ways in which the alliance could respond in the case of supply disruptions caused by any of these sources. Missions ‘designed to secure the supply of oil and gas in an actual crisis or conflict situation’ could involve ‘short-term maritime escort operations, protecting oil rigs and terminals, assisting national authorities to protect loading/off-loading and protection of refineries and storage sites’\textsuperscript{47}. Furthermore, ‘in extreme circumstances energy assets could also be protected by the activation of quick reaction forces which could be permanently on standby’\textsuperscript{48}. Additionally, NATO could ‘protect certain critical choke points when faced by a specifically heightened threat or conflict situation’\textsuperscript{49}. NATO suggests that a multinational maritime task force could be formed to ‘deter attacks against important energy assets such as oil or liquid petroleum gas tankers’\textsuperscript{50} and ‘police and protect the high seas’\textsuperscript{51}. NATO has already been engaged in three naval missions with energy security components - Operation Active Endeavour, Operation Allied Protector and Operation Ocean Shield. Set up in October 2001 in response to 9/11, Active Endeavour’s stated aim is ‘to help protect and deter terrorist activity’ and to ‘keep busy trade routes open and safe’. NATO makes clear that protection of oil and gas shipments and gas pipelines linking Africa to Europe is a primary goal of the Operation\textsuperscript{52}. NATO ships focus on bottlenecks where terrorist attacks could disrupt routes through which around 65 per cent of hydrocarbons consumed in Western Europe pass. The mission initially focused on investigating vessels suspected of engagement in terrorist activity, but in 2003 Active Endeavour began escorting commercial ships through the Straits of Gibraltar to protect against terrorist attack.

In 2008 NATO launched a series of anti-piracy naval missions off the coast of Somalia, starting with Operation Allied Provider which delivered protection to World Food Program shipments from October to December 2008. Operation Allied Protector began in March 2009, broadening the approach beyond the protection of specific ships, aiming ‘to deter, defend against and disrupt pirate activities in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa’. August 2009 saw the launch of Operation Ocean Shield which extended Allied Protector’s mandate to include the training of regional governments to improve their capacity to deal with pirate activity. Ships from seven EU Member States have taken part in the NATO efforts. As discussed in Section 3, the anti-piracy efforts off Somalia are motivated in part by oil security concerns. Major oil companies approached NATO in 2008 requesting protection for their ships in the Gulf of Aden. Secretary-General de Hoop Scheffer responded by explaining that routine NATO escorts of private oil tankers might be politically difficult to arrange, but that NATO is keen to play a broader role in ensuring that energy companies can deliver their products ‘as cheaply and safely as possible to our homes and industries’\textsuperscript{53}.

It remains uncertain however, how NATO’s energy security policy will develop. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stressed in a recent speech that energy security is ‘a pressing priority’ for

\textsuperscript{46} NATO Parliamentary Assembly, \textit{Energy Security: Co-operating to enhance the protection of critical energy infrastructure}, 8 December 2008 [online], pp. 5-6, accessed 10 June 2010, available at \url{http://www.nato-pa.int/Docdownload.asp?ID=617FCC1DED0D0107A4}
\textsuperscript{48} Shea, ‘Energy Security: NATO’s Potential Role’
\textsuperscript{49} Shea, ‘Energy Security: NATO’s Potential Role’
\textsuperscript{50} Shea, ‘Energy Security: NATO’s Potential Role’
\textsuperscript{51} Scheffer, Speech ‘Energy security in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century’
\textsuperscript{52} NATO, \textit{Operation Active Endeavour} [online], accessed 10 June 2010, available at \url{http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_7932.htm}
\textsuperscript{53} Scheffer, Speech ‘Energy security in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century’
NATO to address in its forthcoming updated Strategic Concept\textsuperscript{54}. The 2008 NATO Parliamentary Assembly report ‘Energy Security: Co-operating to enhance the protection of Critical Energy Infrastructures’ suggests that NATO naval operations off Somalia provide ‘an interesting case study for examining the prospect of similar types of operation in the event of a specific threat directed at oil or LNG shipments’\textsuperscript{55}. The paper puts forward that the NATO Response Force (the organisation’s 25,000 troop-strong rapid response force) would be well-suited to missions securing energy supply routes. A second 2008 NATO Parliamentary Assembly report ‘Energy Security for the Euro-Atlantic Region’ characterises NATO as a body ideally suited to an energy security role because of its position as ‘a unique vehicle for co-operation and co-ordination among members of the trans-Atlantic community’ and its ‘intensive co-operation with the energy-rich countries in the Gulf’\textsuperscript{56}. Other commentators are uncertain that NATO is the appropriate body for military responses to energy security problems, citing the varying interests of the organisation’s diverse membership as a barrier to progress\textsuperscript{57}, and the desire of some European NATO member states to see the EU’s CSDP developing its own capacity to respond militarily\textsuperscript{58}.

**2.3 British and French Defence Policy and Energy Security**

The British government pursues a defence policy which aims to build expeditionary capability to protect UK interests abroad, including the flow of key resources such as oil. The December 2003 UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) White Paper suggests that Britain must maintain ‘the continuing free flow of natural resources’\textsuperscript{59}. Britain’s 2008 National Security Strategy states that competition for energy represents ‘one of the biggest potential drivers of the breakdown of the rules-based international system and the re-emergence of major inter-state conflict’\textsuperscript{60}. The cross-department ‘Britain in the World’ briefing of early 2007 states that ‘we are likely to use our armed forces in both conflict and non-conflict situations to intervene at source when our strategic interests are threatened’\textsuperscript{61}. A recent MOD study puts forward that ‘access to resources (energy, food or water) will drive states’ security interests’ and that ‘control over these resources and their methods of distribution through


\textsuperscript{56} Varwick, Johannes, ‘Protecting Oil and Gas Resources: NATO’s Role in Energy Security’, *Der Spiegel* (7 January 2008), [online], accessed 10 June 2010, available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,563210,00.html


the global commons will be a critical feature of conflict in the international system”. It goes on to assert that by 2020 the UK ‘will be critically dependent upon energy imports and securing them will be non-discretionary.’ The paper predicts that it will be more likely in the future that the UK will ‘use the military instrument for reasons of fear and interest...where our national interest is challenged by threats to resources’, and that Britain’s military will ‘fight to protect those things that, as a nation, we consider to be essential to our way of life’. The study considers energy supplies a key ‘threat driver’ for the UK over the coming years.

This approach was first articulated by the Labour government in its 1998 Strategic Defence Review which makes clear that the military will increasingly need to be able to protect Britain’s ‘vital economic interests’. These vital interests include ‘supplies of raw materials, above all oil’. A key future challenge to international stability is likely to be ‘competition for scarce resources’. The Persian Gulf, where Britain maintains ‘particularly important national interests’, is likely to be the locus of such competition. The review acknowledges that Gulf oil is ‘crucial to the world economy’. Britain ‘must be prepared to go to the crisis, rather than have the crisis come to us’. ‘Intervention operations’ are ‘a vital component of our security policy’. ‘Protecting our interests overseas’ requires ‘a clear focus on projecting force, further afield and even more quickly than has previously been the case’.

Yet the British military is said to be disadvantaged by ‘areas of weakness’, which include ‘the extent of our rapid deployment capabilities and our ability to sustain and support overseas operations’. To remedy this ‘weakness’ the Review announces plans to build two large new aircraft carriers ‘to project power more flexibly around the world’. A renewed aircraft carrier capacity is intended to strengthen Britain’s ‘coercive presence’ ‘in the Gulf’ and elsewhere. The projected cost of the aircraft carriers, including the new planes they will carry, is £25 billion, with the carriers expected to enter service in 2016 and 2018. The UK’s new coalition government will produce a Strategic Defence Review by the end of 2010 which will indicate whether the policy of the previous Labour government will be maintained and the carriers built.

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63 *ibid*, p. 5

64 *ibid*, p. 8

65 The 1998 review remains the most recent, though a new review is due to be published in the second half of 2010


67 *ibid*, p. 11

68 *ibid*, p. 13

69 *ibid*, p. 16

70 *ibid*, pp. 4-5

71 UK Ministry of Defence, *Delivering Security in a Changing World*, p. 4

72 *ibid*, p. 7

73 UK Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Defence Review*, p. 9

74 *ibid*, p. 5

75 *ibid*, p. 144

Britain’s Navy in particular has been active in putting this defence strategy into practice. In 2006 the Royal Navy and US Navy helped protect Saudi offshore oil facilities from the threat of terrorist attack\(^7\). In 2008, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced that the British military would offer training for Nigerian security forces to help them better protect the oil facilities of the Niger Delta from insurgent attacks\(^8\). The latest training course for Nigerian forces led by the Royal Marines 1st Assault Group concluded in March of this year\(^9\). Despite Britain’s withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq in 2009, the Royal Navy has remained in Iraqi waters to train the Iraqi Navy to protect its oil terminals from attack by pirates and insurgents\(^10\). In addition, UK ships have taken part in both NATO and EU missions off the coast of Somalia.

The defence policy of Europe’s other major military power, France, is developing along similar lines, though thus far without a firm commitment to a new aircraft carrier to enhance expeditionary capacity. The French government’s 2008 White Book on defence and national security\(^11\) identifies rising European energy demand and the concentration of energy resources in unstable regions like the Middle East and West Africa as conflict drivers for the future. The report makes clear that ‘overexploitation’\(^12\) of strategic energy resources will boost tension and the risk of conflict between states. The report also notes the risk of terrorist attack on hydrocarbon supply routes to the EU\(^13\). Like the British government, the French defence strategy places great value on force projection and the ability to intervene. The White Book indicates that the French military should increase its expeditionary capabilities, potentially by constructing a new aircraft carrier to augment France’s existing Charles de Gaulle carrier. A decision on construction will be taken by the French government by the end of 2012\(^14\).

While a joint French-British project to cut costs by pooling resources in the construction of both countries’ proposed new aircraft carriers fell apart in 2008, the impact of the economic crisis on defence budgets on both sides of the Channel has increased the value of both a bilateral Franco-British and a European approach to defence. Both French and British Defence policies seem to be converging on the issue of CSDP. The UK Ministry of Defence’s February 2010 White Paper presents the most positive vision yet from Britain of CSDP. The Paper states that the ‘UK will greatly improve its influence if we and our European partners act in concert’, playing a ‘robust role in crisis management’\(^15\). The French White Book is equally enthusiastic about CSDP and indicates that the Franco-British relationship will be a key element of a successful CSDP. A CSDP led by France and

\(^10\) The Times, ‘British Navy leads the way as Iraqi sailors learn to safeguard nation’s oil trade’, 3 December 2009 [online], accessed 10 June 2010, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article6941680.ece
\(^12\) French Government, Défense et Sécurité Nationale: Le Livre Blanc, p. 25
\(^13\) French Government, Défense et Sécurité Nationale: Le Livre Blanc, p. 50
\(^15\) French Government, Défense et Sécurité Nationale: Le Livre Blanc: p. 32
Britain, both committed to building expeditionary military capabilities in order to protect key strategic resources such as oil suggests that European defence policy could follow a similar trajectory. The launch of major CSDP mission Operation Atalanta is noteworthy given the mission's important energy security component.

### 2.4 Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

CSDP, formerly ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy), was launched in 1999 to provide the EU with an independent military and civilian means of responding to international crises. The launch followed Tony Blair’s and Jacques Chirac’s 1998 St Malo declaration which established that the EU ‘must have capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces’. Since 2003, there have been 23 CSDP missions around the world mostly deploying police, judges and civilian administrators. There have been six purely military CSDP missions in Bosnia, Macedonia, Chad, two in the Congo and the ongoing mission off the coast of Somalia.

The strategic vision underpinning CSDP takes account of energy security concerns and the need for expeditionary military capability to meet those concerns. The European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 notes the vulnerability of a European Union increasingly dependent on imported fossil fuels. Energy dependence and competition for natural resources are identified as a key 'global challenges' informing security policy\(^86\). The Council's 2008 review of the ESS reiterates the dangers of EU dependence on oil and gas from unstable regions\(^87\). Force projection over long distance is put forward as the security approach to remedy the EU's increasing vulnerability. European military forces must be transformed into 'more flexible, mobile forces'\(^88\). Since 2007, the EU has had two battlegroups, each comprising 1500 troops, on permanent standby ready to be deployed. While not exactly a standing EU army, the battlegroups represent the first forces exclusively available for EU missions. The groups can be deployed within ten days and can be sustained for up to four months. Beyond the battlegroups, the EU’s capacity to respond remains quite limited. Member States earmark a certain portion of their national military forces for potential EU missions. On paper Member States have committed a force comprising 60,000 combat troops, 100 ships and 400 aircraft deployable within 60 days and sustainable for one year. In practice, this represents a catalogue of troops and equipment which Member States could potentially make available to the EU if they decided to participate in a particular EU-level mission. The UK MOD has 12,500 troops, 18 warships and 73 combat aircraft theoretically available for potential EU missions. Member States make military assets available on a voluntary, *ad hoc* basis, so there is no obligation for a country to supply the catalogued troops.

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\(^{86}\) Council of the European Union, *European Security Strategy*, p. 3


3 Operation Atalanta

Operation Atalanta, the EU’s first naval mission, was launched in December 2008 ‘to help deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia’. Operation Atalanta operates in support of the United Nations Security Council’s June 2008 Resolution 1816 which permits states to use ‘all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery’ within the territorial waters of Somalia. The EU describes three primary goals for Atalanta: to protect World Food Programme shipments to Somalia; to protect vulnerable shipping in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean off Somalia; and to deter and intervene to stop pirates from carrying out attacks in the area. Initially set up to run for twelve months, the mission has since been extended until December 2012. On average in 2009 Atalanta comprised seven warships and three maritime patrol aircraft. Atalanta’s operational zone stretches from the south of the Red Sea, through the Gulf of Aden into the Indian Ocean as far as the Seychelles.

Atalanta coordinates with other naval missions fulfilling a similar brief in the region, including US-led Combined Task Force 151, a NATO Maritime Group, and warships representing Russia, India, Japan, Malaysia, Iran and China. At any one time up to 30 international warships are patrolling off the Somali coast. EU Member State warships have taken part in anti-piracy efforts in the region prior to Atalanta. As early as 2001 EU ships were involved in US-led Operation Enduring Freedom, as part of Combined Task Force 150 patrolling off the Horn of Africa. Prompted by an increase in Somali pirate attacks in 2007 and 2008, some EU Member States independently sent naval forces to protect their national shipping in the area. European ships are involved in NATO Maritime Units deployed to counter piracy since October 2008. Atalanta, however, is the first joint EU effort and is largely a response to the changing nature and frequency of pirate attacks in 2008. 111 attacks were recorded in 2008, a 150 per cent increase on the 44 recorded in 2007. The EU believes that there are now between 500 and 1000 people involved in organising and perpetrating Somali pirate raids. The pirates’ tactics also changed in 2008. Instead of simply stealing cargo, pirates started taking hostages and seizing entire ships, then demanding ransom payments for their release. The pirates’ ambitions grew with more and more attacks on large ships including oil tankers, previously believed to be too difficult for pirates to attack. In addition, and largely as a result of the increasing number of warships policing the Gulf of Aden, pirates began to shift their operations into the Indian Ocean, ever further from the Somali coast. Pirates are now able to operate as far as 1100 miles off the Somali coast, as demonstrated by the attack on the MV Nele Maersk container ship in November 2009. By the end of 2009, pirates were holding for ransom 263 hostages on twelve vessels.

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The impact of Somali piracy on international shipping has been significant. 20 per cent of world trade is transported through the Gulf of Aden, with 30,000 ships passing through each year transporting goods between Europe and Asia. Indian Ocean shipping lanes key to Asian-African trade also skirt the eastern coast of Somalia, as do important routes from the Middle East to North America. Insurance costs have increased tenfold for ships passing through the Gulf of Aden as a result of increased pirate activity. To avoid this route, some shipping companies have sent ships destined for Europe around the Cape of Good Hope, a journey which takes two to three weeks longer to complete and uses considerably more fuel. Beyond trade, piracy has disrupted crucial UN humanitarian shipments to Somalia. In 2007 World Food Programme aid deliveries were frequently suspended because of pirate attacks. It was only after military escorts were introduced in November 2007 that aid ships were able to operate unhindered. No aid ship has been hijacked since the escorts began.

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3.1 What can Atalanta do and how successful has it been?

Atalanta is mandated to arrest and detain suspected pirates, who can then be transferred to an EU Member State, Kenya or the Seychelles to face prosecution. In March 2010, the Mission was extended to incorporate the control of Somali ports where pirate ships are based, and the active hunting down and disabling of pirate mother ships. 706 suspected pirates were stopped by international naval forces between August 2008 and December 2009. Of these 411 were released because of limits on prosecution capacity in Kenya, a country with a large backlog of criminal cases awaiting trial. In addition, legal uncertainties make EU Member States reluctant to try Somali pirates back in the EU\(^98\). Only 46 of the 706 suspects stopped have been convicted\(^99\). Although trying and convicting pirates has proved problematic, Rear Admiral Peter Hudson, Commander of the Atalanta Mission, claims that pirate activity has been ‘severely disrupted’ as a result of naval intervention. While Atalanta and other naval missions do not appear to have acted as a deterrent to pirate attacks, they do seem to have substantially reduced the number of successful hijackings. The number of Somali pirate attacks in 2009 was double that of 2008, but the number of successful hijacks decreased both in real terms and as a proportion of overall attacks\(^100\).

The EU, including the military leadership of Operation Atalanta, is clear that there is no military solution to the problem of Somali piracy and that only wider EU engagement in Somalia will solve the problem. The EU is currently providing €215 million in development aid to Somalia over the period from 2008 to 2013, alongside around €44 million annually in humanitarian aid. The development aid supports a range of projects including helping to develop legal processes to deal with detained pirates in Kenya and the Seychelles, paying the salaries of the Ugandan and Burundian soldiers who defend the TFG in Mogadishu, paying salaries of Somali policemen, providing training for police and prison guards, and supporting the elections in the northern Somaliland province. The common EU costs of the Atalanta mission amount to €8.3 million; this pays for the Operational Headquarters in Northwood, just outside London, and the Force Headquarters, which are based on an EU frigate in the Gulf of Aden. Naval assets are contributed on a country by country basis, costs being borne by individual Member States. In total these costs amount to around €500 million\(^101\).

Casualties of the engagement between pirates and international forces have been relatively few but nonetheless represent the tragic cost of piracy and the military response to it. Of 1052 hostages taken by pirates in 2009, eight were killed\(^102\). Of 706 pirates engaged by international naval missions, eleven have been killed\(^103\). Sporadic casualties have continued in 2010. In May the Russian military stormed a hijacked Russian oil tanker, freeing the crew and killing one pirate.

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\(^98\) While states are permitted by international law to transfer pirate suspects to their territory for trial, domestic legal idiosyncrasies can make it difficult to carry out prosecutions. In 2009, for example, the Danish Navy was forced to release 10 pirate suspects because Danish law only permits such prosecutions in cases where pirates attack Danish vessels or citizens.


\(^100\) International Chamber of Commerce, 2009 Piracy Figures surpass 400


\(^103\) EU NAVFOR, Press Conference
Controversially, the Russians cast ten captured pirates off to sea without navigational equipment, leaving them with little chance of survival.\(^{104}\)

### 3.2 Operation Atalanta and Energy Security

The European Union has been clear that a key objective of Operation Atalanta is to protect seaborne trade. Among the most valuable cargo shipped around the coast of Somalia is crude oil. The Commission recognised the crucial role of the seas in the transport of fossil fuels in its Integrated Maritime Strategy of 2007.\(^{105}\) As explained in Section 1, oil is of unique strategic value to industrial societies. Around 11 per cent of the world’s seaborne oil is shipped through the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. 20 per cent of EU oil imports come from the Middle East,\(^{106}\) making the sea route through the Red Sea to Suez and into the Mediterranean especially important to European economies. Middle Eastern oil supplies to the US are also shipped through the Indian Ocean, around the Cape of Good Hope to the Atlantic. Somali pirates have carried out 24 attacks on oil tankers since April 2008 (see Box 2) and have succeeded in hijacking six of these ships. The capture by pirates of the Saudi super-tanker Sirius Star in November 2008 made headlines around the world. Bound for the US carrying two million barrels of oil worth about $100 million, the Sirius Star was the largest ship ever seized by pirates. The hijack took place 420 miles off the Somali coast, in waters previously considered relatively safe. News of the hijack increased the price of crude on world markets by 1.4 per cent.\(^{107}\) The ship was eventually released in January 2009, after the payment of a $3 million ransom by the ship owners to the pirates. Just over a year from the taking of the Sirius Star, a second tanker carrying Saudi oil to the US, the Maran Centaurus, was hijacked 800 miles off Somalia carrying $150 million worth of crude. The ship was released in January of this year for a reported ransom of $7 million. Four oil tankers have been hijacked so far in 2010. Hijackings increase the cost of transporting oil as a result of ransom payments, indirectly through rising insurance premiums, and by delaying deliveries. Hijacked oil tankers have typically been held for around two months before a ransom was paid and the ships released.

Atalanta has been hailed as a major development in EU military missions. Recent analysis\(^{109}\) suggests that Atalanta is a deliberate attempt by the EU to boost CDSP as an instrument which can serve EU interests - primarily concerning trade and energy security - directly with military force, without reliance on NATO. CDSP missions have generally taken over control of old NATO missions. This is not the case with Atalanta and as well as being the EU’s first naval mission, it is the first CDSP mission not to rely on NATO assets. High profile missions like Atalanta may be useful politically for galvanising the developing CDSP and boosting the EU’s presence in the international arena. Piracy’s impact on trade and energy security affects all EU Member States, and this common

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\(^{107}\) Two million barrels of oil is equal to about 25 per cent of Saudi Arabia’s daily production.


\(^{109}\) Germond & Smith, ‘Re-Thinking European Security Interests and the ESDP: Explaining the EU’s Anti-Piracy Operation’
understanding of threat make anti-piracy missions a convenient instrument for agreement between all Member States in the controversial area of EU defence. The fact that large oil tankers have become frequent targets of pirate attacks indicates that Atalanta could set a precedent for future CSDP military deployments responding to energy security problems.

**Box 2 - Attacks by Somali Pirates on Oil Tankers**

- 25.05.10 - MV Nord Neptuna - attacked off Tanzanian coast, between Zanzibar and Pemba
- 05.05.10 - MV Moscow University - attacked and hijacked 500 miles off Somali coast
- 25.04.10 - Japanese tanker - attacked in Arabian Sea off Somalia
- 22.04.10 - Iranian tanker - attacked in Gulf of Aden
- 05.04.10 - MV Samho Dream - attacked and hijacked 600 miles off Somali coast
- 27.03.10 - MV Saveh - attacked 300 miles north-east of the Seychelles
- 05.03.10 - MV UBT Ocean - attacked and hijacked off Madagascar
- 03.03.10 - MV Al Nisr Al Saudi - attacked and hijacked in Gulf of Aden
- 22.02.10 - MV Barakaale 1 - attacked in Gulf of Aden
- 16.01.10 - MT Jag Layak - attacked in Gulf of Aden
- 30.11.09 - MV Maran Centaurus - attacked and hijacked in Indian Ocean, 800 miles off Somali coast
- 09.11.09 - BW Lion - attacked in Indian Ocean, 1000 miles east of Mogadishu
- 03.11.09 - MV Jo Cedar - attacked in Indian Ocean, 360 miles east of Mombasa
- 21.07.09 - Yemeni tanker - attacked in Gulf of Aden
- 13.07.09 - MV Elephant - attacked in Gulf of Aden
- 15.06.09 - Yemeni tanker - attacked in Red Sea
- 02.05.09 - MV Kition - attacked in Gulf of Aden
- 27.04.09 - Yemeni tanker - attacked in Gulf of Aden
- 29.01.09 - MV Longchamp - attacked and hijacked in Gulf of Aden
- 02.01.09 - MV Kriti Episkopi - attacked in Gulf of Aden
- 15.11.08 - MV Sirius Star - attacked and hijacked in Indian Ocean, 420 miles off Somali coast
- 12.11.08 - MV Karogol - attacked and hijacked in Gulf of Aden
- 24.09.08 - US MSC John Lenthall - attacked in Gulf of Aden
- 22.04.08 - MV Takayama - attacked in Gulf of Aden
The Gulf of Guinea – CSDP’s next naval mission?

The world’s second major sea piracy hotspot after the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean off Somalia is the Gulf of Guinea, off the West African coast. Around 50 percent of pirate attacks in this area are believed to go unreported\(^\text{110}\), though 32 attacks had been recorded up to the end of October 2009\(^\text{111}\). Most piracy in the region is carried out by Nigerian militia groups motivated by political grievance and the prospect of financial gain\(^\text{112}\).

The Gulf of Guinea\(^\text{113}\)

The Gulf of Guinea and waters off the lower West African coast carry oil exports from two of the continent’s largest oil producers Nigeria and Angola, as well as from smaller producers like Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon and Congo-Brazzaville. West Africa is already a crucial source of oil for the United States, with 25 per cent of US oil imports predicted to come from this region by 2015. With North Sea oil production in decline, the EU too is becoming more dependent on West African oil. Already 3 per cent of EU oil imports and 5 per cent of gas imports\(^\text{114}\) are coming from Nigeria alone\(^\text{115}\). Even at current levels, piracy is affecting oil production in the region. The government of Cameroon has said that piracy is affecting investment in its oil industry, with


\(^{112}\) See pp. 27-8


\(^{115}\) All of the EU’s gas imports from Nigeria are transported in the form of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) by sea
production down 13 per cent in 2010. Security measures put in place by the international oil companies to protect offshore oil infrastructure are costing $3.5 billion a year.

Gulf of Guinea pirates began launching major strikes on oil facilities in 2008. The militant group, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), attacked Nigeria’s largest offshore oil installation in June 2008, shutting down production at the Shell-run facility and kidnapping one foreign oil worker. Later that year an oil company tugboat was raided off the coast of Cameroon with ten crew members taken hostage. In January 2009 pirates hijacked a French oil company ship off the Nigerian coast, and the oil tanker MT Front Chief was attacked by pirates resulting in the death of one crew member. The most recent attack affecting the oil industry took place in November 2009 when pirates attacked the oil tanker MT Cancale Star off the coast of Benin.

While the piracy situation in the Gulf of Guinea is not yet as severe as that off the Somali coast, international institutions are warning that the situation could deteriorate. In October 2008, the United Nations’ Special Representative for West Africa, Said Djinnit, called for a collective security response to the Gulf’s pirate problem. Djinnit suggested that the UN could facilitate security cooperation between West African states and international stakeholders, while urging the US and Europe to provide training and equipment to African navies. A senior NATO official noted in March 2010 that counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Guinea were a possibility because of the area’s importance for energy deliveries.

The US and several European countries have already stepped up their military presence in the region. In June 2004, the US Navy deployed two aircraft carrier battlegroups off the West African coast in what one US diplomat described as a ‘show of force’. US naval operations in the Gulf have increased steadily since then, driven, according to the US Navy, by the objective to ‘ensure a more stable maritime environment’ for the transport of key resources like oil. In March 2007, a French warship joined US-led naval exercises off the coast of Cameroon designed to provide training for naval officers from oil-rich Gabon, Sao Tomé and Principe, and Cameroon. A NATO Maritime Group including ships from Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and Denmark, conducted so-called

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‘presence operations’ in the Gulf in the summer of 2007, before moving on to the Somali coast\textsuperscript{125}. In November 2007, the US deployed ships to the Gulf to act as ‘floating schoolhouses’ ‘to train local forces in port and oil-platform security’ and ‘search and rescue missions’. Naval personnel from Spain, the UK, Portugal and Germany helped deliver this training to sailors from West African states including Angola, Cameroon, Sao Tomé and Principe, and Gabon. This mission helped establish the fledgling US Africa Command (AFRICOM) (see Section 2).

The increased US-European presence in the Gulf of Guinea since 2004 indicates that a robust naval response is probable if piracy escalates in the area, as it has done off Somalia. In addition, and as in the Somali case, multiple major world powers including China and India, share an interest in secure oil exports from Nigeria, increasing the likelihood of international consensus and possible UN-backed action should pirate attacks increase. From a CSDP perspective, naval operations in the Gulf of Guinea to counter a piracy surge would represent an opportunity to further establish the EU’s military role, as well as to provide protection for oil tankers.

5 The Trans-Sahara Gas Pipeline (TSGP)

First conceived in the 1970s, the Trans-Sahara Gas Pipeline is one of the most ambitious hydrocarbon infrastructure projects ever designed. Intended to transport Nigerian gas to the European market, the pipeline would traverse 4,300 km crossing Nigeria and Niger before terminating in Algeria, from where gas could be transported through existing infrastructure to Italy and Spain. TSGP is also intended to supply gas to central and northern Nigeria, Niger and southern Algeria, areas currently without access to gas. Nigerian gas reserves are substantial at 5 trillion cubic metres (tcm)\textsuperscript{126}, the seventh largest in the world, easily enough to fill the annual 30 billion cubic metres (bcm) capacity of TSGP. Nigeria’s gas is high quality, with low sulphur content making it easy to refine, and is thus highly sought after by international energy companies.

Feasibility studies by Shell and Bechtel in the 1980s did not generate sufficient political or commercial interest to get the project off the ground. The project was revived by the African Union’s New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) programme and in January 2002 Nigeria and Algeria signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) confirming political will to push the project forward. A 2006 feasibility study estimated the cost of constructing TSGP at $10 billion. In July 2009, Nigeria, Niger and Algeria signed an intergovernmental agreement to promote the pipeline. The three nations hope that construction will begin in 2012, and that the pipeline will become operational either in 2015 or 2016. Funding for the project is yet to be secured, but interest from a variety of international actors has blossomed since 2008. EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs initially expressed interest in TSGP at a Brussels conference promoting the project in July 2007. In July 2008, Russian government-controlled gas company Gazprom entered talks with the Nigerian government on TSGP. In August, the conflict between Russia and Georgia broke out. This prompted fears in Brussels that the proposed Southern Corridor gas route through Georgia might not be as safe from Russian interference as had been anticipated\textsuperscript{127}. The prospect of further Russian control over EU gas supply was underlined by the signing in early September 2008 of a MoU between Gazprom and Nigeria covering a range of energy issues including gas infrastructure and production. Gazprom offered Nigeria substantial development assistance for improving its own gas infrastructure to enable Nigerian president Yar-Adua to increase access to energy in areas of the country currently off-grid.

A week later, Andris Piebalgs visited Nigerian capital Abuja to offer Nigeria an €840 million grant to pay for energy projects, some of which could be used for TSGP. Piebalgs made clear that the EU would be able to provide crucial financial support to TSGP with a loan from the European Investment Bank (EIB). The European Commission’s Second Strategic Energy Review of November 2008 noted that TSGP ‘represents an important additional opportunity for the EU to diversify routes

\textsuperscript{126}BP, Statistical Review of World Energy, p. 22

\textsuperscript{127}Andris Piebalgs made this motivation clear during his September visit to Abuja, see Financial Times, ‘Brussels takes on Gazprom in Nigeria’, 17 September 2008
and energy sources’ and that the EU ‘stands ready to help in its realization through its various
instruments, notably bilateral cooperation, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership
Instrument, the European Development Fund and the European Investment Bank.’

Positioning for influence with the Nigerian government continued in early 2009 with France’s energy
giant Total announcing its readiness to take part in TSGP in February. In June 2009, Gazprom signed
a $2.5 billion deal with the Nigerian National Petroleum Company to build gas refineries, pipelines
and power stations in the country. The deal is reported to include the construction of a gas pipeline
running from southern Nigeria to the north of the country which could feed into TSGP at a later
stage. Since the signing of the intergovernmental agreement in July, there have been no further
clues as to who will come out on top in the battle for control over TSGP.

5.1 Security Issues and TSGP

TSGP is an ambitious project, not only in terms of its scale but also because it aims to source gas
from the Niger Delta, a conflict zone in which hydrocarbon infrastructure is routinely sabotaged by
militia groups. The TSGP may also face threats from militia groups and terrorists in transit states
Niger and Algeria. A report by the Jamestown Foundation suggested that the completed pipeline
would require ‘constant patrolling and expensive surveillance systems’ to guard against attack.
The threat in Nigeria is probably the most serious, and a leading militia group, the Movement for
the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has already issued a statement threatening to attack
the TSGP. This is no idle threat, as militia groups have proved their ability to substantially curtail
oil production in the region by destroying pipelines. Production fell to 1.8 million bpd in 2009, from
2.6 million bpd in 2008 as a result of sabotage.

Grinding poverty, environmental degradation caused by the oil industry and state repression have
inspired a powerful militia movement in the Delta. To compound matters, an ‘economy of
conflict’ has developed around the militia movement, providing many unemployed young men of
the Delta a living through the illicit oil trade and kidnap/ransom industry. Over 70 per cent of the
Delta population lives on less than $1 a day and life expectancy is 45.

Pollution from the oil industry has ruined once productive agricultural land and poisoned rivers once rich with fish. An estimated 9-13 million barrels of oil have been spilt in the Delta over the past 50 years, equivalent

129 IFRI, ‘Le Trans Saharan Gas Pipeline Mirage ou réelle opportunité?’, March 2010 [online], accessed 10 June
130 Jamestown Foundation, ‘Is the Trans-Sahara Gas Pipeline a Viable Project? The Impact of Terrorism Risk’, 13
131 Oil & Gas Journal, ‘Nigerian militants threaten proposed Trans-Sahara gas line’, 7 July 2009
132 ibid.
134 World Bank and UK Department for International Development, Country Partnership Strategy for the
135 The Economist, ‘Nigeria: Another deadline goes up in flames’, 3 April 2008
to 50 Exxon-Valdez disasters. The United Nations describe the Delta region as blighted by 'abject poverty, filth and squalor, and endemic conflict'. Human Rights Watch notes that the lack of basic social services in the Delta represents a 'shocking and disastrous failure' on the part of the Nigerian government. Violent and non-violent civil society groups developed in the 1990s responding to the state's failure to adequately provide for the people of the Delta. Groups like Ken Saro-Wiwa's Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) pursued non-violent methods to demand a fair share of the oil revenues and compensation for environmental pollution. The Abacha dictatorship met MOSOP's challenge with extreme violence, killing thousands of Ogoni protestors. Subsequent civilian rulers in Nigeria have also resorted to violence in response to challenges from groups like MEND and the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force, who have attacked oil infrastructure and kidnapped oil workers. Amnesty International has reported that Nigerian government 'security forces kill people and destroy property and homes with impunity'. In 2009, Amnesty noted that the military 'continued to commit human rights violations, including unlawful killings, torture and other ill-treatment, and destruction of homes'. The latest heavy-handed action by the Nigerian government took place in May 2009 with security forces attacking militia bases with many civilian casualties reported. Although a ceasefire between militants and government has been in place since June 2009, the situation remains fragile and far from resolution.

Natural resources are also a source of conflict in Niger, where profits from the mining of uranium have failed to improve the lives of most Nigeriens. The UN lists Niger as the poorest country in the world, bottom out of 182 countries in its Human Development Index. Nigerien uranium is much sought after by the nuclear power industry in Europe, yet the mining of this radioactive metal has caused health problems both for the people of northern Niger and the livestock they depend on. Greenpeace studies have shown high levels of uranium in local soils and water around uranium mines, as well as high levels of radioactive radon gas in the air. Particularly hard hit have been the nomadic Touareg people of the region, who make up most of the membership of the Mouvement des Nigériens pour la justice (MNJ), which fights for a fairer share of the profits from Niger's uranium industry and for proper environmental protection from the effects of pollution from uranium mining. The MNJ launched violent campaigns against the Nigerien government in the early 1990s and again between 2007 and 2009, with attacks focusing on the Nigerian military, as well as

on uranium mining facilities. Foreign uranium mine workers have also been taken hostage. A February 2010 coup unseated Nigerien President Mamadou Tandja and installed a military government. The new government has indicated that it may pursue a conciliatory approach to the Touareg rebels, and distribute uranium revenues more fairly and productively\textsuperscript{144}. While this may bode well for a peaceful future, it remains to be seen whether Niger will be pacified in time to provide secure transit for the TSGP.

Algeria, the final transit state for TSGP, has supplied gas to Europe securely for many years, despite ongoing problems with terrorism. Energy infrastructure was first attacked by Islamist forces during the 1991-2002 civil war. Since then, Al-Qaida of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has attacked gas pipelines twice, in 2006 and 2007\textsuperscript{145}. The Algerian government invests in substantial security forces to protect its oil and gas infrastructure from attack. With the bulk of the country's reserves located in the Sahara desert, the government can effectively restrict access to most of the hydrocarbon installations and infrastructure. These factors may explain why energy infrastructure has not been more frequently attacked by terrorists. The risk to TSGP in Algeria would appear to be fairly small, however AQIM remain motivated by what they see as the misappropriation of hydrocarbon revenues by the Algerian government\textsuperscript{146}, and could come to view TSGP as a totemic target worthy of attack.

5.2 CSDP and TSGP

Potential security threats as well as the vast scale of TSGP may render the project uneconomic. However, if the EU is serious in its consideration of the project and decides in due course that it is economically viable then it will have to consider what its role in providing security for the pipeline will be. Any EU role in security provision for this project is likely to be controversial. The British government's 2008 announcement that it would be training the Nigerian military to enhance its ability to secure the nation's oil production was met with condemnation from Nigerian human rights groups and militia movements\textsuperscript{147}. The history of Western oil company complicity in human rights abuses by the Nigerian military will also haunt any EU consideration of security responses. While direct CSDP intervention to secure a pipeline might be unlikely, the EU could play a role in training and financial support of the Nigerian military, and indeed the military forces of Niger and Algeria. Any security response relating to the TSGP could tie in with a wider military response to potentially escalating piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, which would most likely occur in conjunction with other military powers with an interest in secure oil shipments from the region.

Importing gas from a conflict zone where frequent attacks on infrastructure occur implies a security response. If left to the Nigerian government this could be bloody, indiscriminate and lacking in respect for human rights. Given the dire humanitarian situation in the Delta, and given the central role of the fossil fuel industry in causing it, the EU should shelve plans to support TSGP, a project likely to stoke the fires of conflict. Instead, the EU should begin to focus on reducing domestic demand for oil and gas so that projects like TSGP do not need to be considered at all.


6 Conclusions

This paper suggests that EU-level military responses to energy security problems may occur in the future and that they are most likely to occur when the world’s great powers are united in common cause to protect shipments of oil in the Middle East and off the African coast. Such interventions represent low-cost, low-risk ways for the EU to develop the military dimension of CSDP and to provide protection to seaborne oil shipments. The EU remains critically reliant on oil and gas, at a time when available supply, especially of oil, is becoming increasingly constrained. The EU’s hydrocarbon dependence is leading it to promote projects such as the Trans-Sahara Gas Pipeline, which envisages sourcing gas from a conflict zone blighted by abject poverty and environmental degradation. At the same time, piracy emanating from failed and failing states like Somalia and Nigeria threatens key oil supply routes, prompting increasing international militarisation of the seas off these countries.

If EU oil and gas demand is not reduced, the imperative to protect fuel supplies with military force will persist and the tendency to seek out ever riskier and morally compromised fossil fuel projects to support will remain. The EU has put forward relatively ambitious binding targets for increasing the share of renewable energy in the overall energy mix. However, these targets will only have a limited effect on consumption of oil, the fuel most likely to drive future military responses. While the target for a 20 per cent share of renewable energy in the energy mix by 2020 may help reduce gas demand, the 10 per cent renewable transport fuel target will, if achieved, still leave European transport 80 per cent reliant on oil by 2020.

The EU should therefore put forward a range of new measures to substantially reduce oil and gas demand across the Member States. Incremental, year by year reduction targets should be set. At a minimum the EU should implement the January 2009 recommendations of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) which call for European oil demand to be reduced ‘by at least 50 percent by 2050 and probably much more’. To achieve this, the EU will need to address oil use in all sectors of the economy, with particular focus on transport, retail and agriculture. Key changes in transport could include a rapid shift from internal combustion engine vehicles to battery-powered electric vehicles; much greater government support for public transport, including innovations such as national coach lanes on motorways linking major population centres; and much greater efforts to encourage walking and cycling for short journeys, through EU-wide improvements to cycle lanes and facilities for pedestrians, for example.

The dependence of retail (including food) on road freight (see Box 1) also needs to be urgently addressed. A move towards regionalisation and re-localisation of production is probable across all sectors over the next twenty years given likely future increases in oil prices which could render much globalised trade uneconomic. The EU should begin to encourage this shift now, especially in agriculture. The high oil prices of 2008 contributed towards sharp increases in food prices, and concomitant social unrest in over thirty developing countries. Reducing oil and gas inputs in farming (fuel for machinery, fossil fuel-based pesticides and fertilisers) will be essential, alongside planning to reduce food supply routes by encouraging local production and markets, and thus

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\[\text{European Economic and Social Committee, ‘Facing the Oil Challenges’, p. 2}
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\[\text{Around half of car journeys cover a distance of less than five miles, and could be replaced by cycling and walking (See Maibach, Steg & Anable, ‘Promoting physical activity and reducing climate change: Opportunities to replace short car trips with active transportation’ Preventive Medicine 49 (2009), pp. 326-7)}
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\[\text{At least in part, this was due to the change of agricultural production away from food to biofuels}
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reducing the need for oil for food transportation. The EESC suggests a range of innovative policy measures affecting transport, power generation, fuel and carbon taxation, and buildings. The EU should also take note of reports by the UK Industry Taskforce on Peak Oil and Energy Security\textsuperscript{153} and Centre for Alternative Technology\textsuperscript{154} which put forward comprehensive proposals on how to rapidly reduce oil consumption in transport, retail, agriculture and home heating.

The EU should develop further its role in making clear the important role of lifestyle choices in reducing oil and gas use. Despite setting crucial targets for renewable energy and energy efficiency, the EU’s 20-20-20 plan\textsuperscript{155} does not comprehensively address the lifestyle choices of EU citizens. In addition, the EU’s existing campaigns addressing energy consumption habits are too low-key and lacking in ambition to really make an impact on EU citizens\textsuperscript{156}. Quakers (amongst others) are committed to lifestyle simplicity and are concerned about global distribution of resources and the ecological impact of resource use. Some Quakers have taken steps to radically reduce their fossil fuel consumption by reducing or abstaining from air and car travel, shifting their diets away from meat and dairy towards plant-based products and substantially reducing energy use in the home, especially through reduced use of home heating. Many of these Quakers are involved in community organisations\textsuperscript{157} which provide companionship and support to help bolster the process of change. Some have achieved 50-70 per cent reductions in their personal greenhouse gas footprints, and most report finding the process of change rewarding\textsuperscript{158}.

The EU should begin to introduce lifestyle change issues into its narrative around climate change and energy consumption. A useful first step would be to start setting a behavioural example through the working practices of the EU institutions and EU officials. This could be done by significantly reducing air travel, minimising energy use in EU buildings and introducing local, organic food in canteens and restaurants. High profile media campaigns could be launched stressing the value of reduced personal energy use in combating climate change and building energy security. The EU’s annual Sustainable Energy Week in Brussels should include seminars on lifestyle issues, and showcase the work of community groups such as the Transition Network\textsuperscript{159} and Aufbruch\textsuperscript{160}. The EU could also provide funding to community groups supporting lifestyle change.

The wider EU approach to energy use needs to shift from one in which securing enough oil and gas to meet rising or static demand is the norm, to one in which reducing demand to diminish the need for fossil fuels becomes the standard. If this shift does not take place, the EU will find itself considering supporting risky, morally compromised fossil fuel projects for years to come.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{153} Industry Taskforce on Peak Oil and Energy Security, ‘The Oil Crunch: a wake-up call for the UK economy’
\textsuperscript{156} See European Commission, DG Environment campaign \url{http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/campaign/index_en.htm} and DG Energy campaign \url{http://www.sustenergy.org/tpl/page.cfm?pageName=videos_and_photos}
\textsuperscript{157} For example, Living Witness Project - \url{http://www.livingwitness.org.uk}, Transition Network - \url{http://www.transitionnetwork.org}, and Global Action Plan - \url{http://www.globalactionplan.org.uk}
\textsuperscript{159} \url{http://www.transitionnetwork.org/}
\textsuperscript{160} \url{http://www.anders-besser-leben.de/}
\end{footnotesize}
The EU should abandon its proposed support of the TSGP, acknowledging the grave security risks to the project and the dire situation in the Niger Delta which the project could exacerbate. In addition, the EU should not treat Atalanta as a benchmark for future CSDP interventions to protect oil shipments, and should recognise that such missions can do little to contribute towards long-term energy security. The EU should instead focus its efforts on achieving substantial and rapid reductions in oil consumption.
Appendix 1 – EU-CSDP and NATO

Map showing EU and NATO membership overlap.\(^{161}\)

NATO and the EU are overlapping institutions. 21 of the 27 EU Member States are NATO members, with five non-NATO EU Member States having bilateral cooperation agreements with NATO through the Partnership for Peace programme\(^{162}\). While NATO and CSDP enjoy a somewhat ambiguous relationship, it is hard to see them as entirely distinct entities. They have developed to some extent as both partner organisations and rivals. The Berlin Plus agreement of December 2002 between NATO and the EU established that CSDP missions would only be launched if NATO declined to intervene first in any given crisis situation. In addition Berlin Plus guaranteed EU access to NATO assets and operational planning facilities to carry out its own missions. The two institutions have no agreed operational or geographic division of labour. CSDP’s organisational structure is modelled on NATO’s, and although CSDP has been considered distinct because of its civilian component, NATO


too is now developing its civilian capacity. Both organisations conceive of security along similar lines and share the core aim of building rapid reaction expeditionary capacity to respond to international crises. Both rely in many instances on the same resources. For instance, NATO’s Response Force and the EU battlegroups both draw on the same collection of combat-ready troops from across the EU Member States. Some worry that NATO and the EU follow each other so closely that they risk duplicating each other’s missions. A NATO fleet joined Operation Atalanta in 2009 prompting allegations of poor coordination and inefficiency, and that the two organisations might be better off consolidating missions into single shared operations.\(^{163}\) NATO has taken the lead by setting the agenda for the discussion of military responses to energy security. Although the EU has not pronounced clearly its interest in the military dimension of energy security, with NATO setting the agenda on this issue, CSDP could follow. Like NATO, the EU is already engaged in the anti-piracy effort off the coast of Somalia which is, in part, an energy security mission.

\(^{163}\) See Foreign Policy, ‘When great powers compete, the pirates win’, 30 March 2009 [online], accessed 11 June 2010, available at
Appendix 2 – How Somali pirates operate and why

Somali pirates attack using speedboats and a variety of modern weapons including AK-47 machine guns, rocket launchers and grenades. Pirates make use of the latest technology to plan and carry out attacks. A typical pirate attack involves ten men on three boats. Pirates approach their target, usually firing on it before boarding using ladders and grappling hooks. Once aboard, the pirates head for the bridge, and take control of the ship by force. For long range attacks, pirates operate from mother ships, which enable them to use speedboats many miles from the coast. Captured ships are steered back to the Somali coast, and ransom negotiations with the ship owners begin.

Somali piracy developed following the collapse of the Somali state in 1991. With no coastguard to protect its coastal fisheries, Somalia’s rich stocks of lobster, tuna, shark and other fish have been illegally exploited by fishing vessels from Europe and Asia. Estimated annual losses to Somalia from illegal fishing range from around $90 million to $300 million. The first pirate gangs grew out of Somali fishermen’s efforts to repel illegal trawlers from Somali waters. Sometimes such trawlers were seized and ransoms extracted from fishing companies for their release. A desperate attempt by beleaguered Somalis to defend their livelihood from thieves soon became a lucrative pirate enterprise in itself, and a surer way for many young Somali men to earn a living. By 2009, Somali piracy had become a multi-million dollar industry, with total ransoms taken that year estimated at between $60-$80 million. Average individual ransom payments amount to about $1.5 million.

Much of the proceeds from Somali piracy are believed to be laundered by crime syndicates in the Middle East, who are able not only to manage large quantities of illicit cash, but also to provide pirates with access to modern technologies such as Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and satellite phones, as well as state of the art weapons.

The sudden influx of wealth from piracy has done little to improve the lives and well-being of most of the Somali population. Somalia has some of the poorest development indicators of any country in the world. The collapse of the Siad Barre government in 1991 and subsequent civil war brought about further decline in already poor living conditions in the country. Income per capita is $226, less than half the average for sub-Saharan Africa. 43 per cent of the population live on less than $1 a day, 73 per cent live on less than $2. Life expectancy for men is 47. Around two-thirds of Somalis living in urban areas are unemployed, with 40 percent of the rural population also without work. According to the UN, 3.64 million Somalis are in need of humanitarian assistance, with one in five Somali children suffering from acute malnourishment. A national government was re-

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165 EU NAVFOR, Press Conference, 2 February 2010
166 The Economist, ‘The Long War of the Waters’, 7 January 2010
established in 2004, but the new Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has to date failed to exert control over Somalia’s territory, most of which remains under the rule of various warlords and clans. Without a functioning state in control of all Somali territory, and with so few routes out of poverty for most Somalis, conditions have been fertile for the growth of piracy. The TFG is unable to police the onshore command centres from which pirate activities are coordinated and launched, hence pirates and their support networks can operate for the most part with impunity. The EU has launched a CSDP mission (EUTM Somalia) to train 2000 Somali soldiers in Uganda, who will in turn be stationed in Somalia to support the TFG.  

Appendix 3 – Major military operations

Operations with energy security components involving EU Member States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>EU Member States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ocean Shield</td>
<td>2009 - present</td>
<td>Gulf of Aden/Indian Ocean</td>
<td>21 (as NATO Members)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atalanta</td>
<td>2008 - present</td>
<td>Gulf of Aden/Indian Ocean</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Freedom</td>
<td>2003 - present</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>14 (see footnote)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Endeavour</td>
<td>2001 - present</td>
<td>Mediterranean Sea</td>
<td>21 (as NATO Members)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desert Storm</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Iraq/Kuwait</td>
<td>13 (see footnote)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earnest Will</td>
<td>1987 - 1988</td>
<td>Persian Gulf</td>
<td>3 (UK, France, Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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172 Participating forces: UK, Spain, Italy, Poland, Denmark, Czech Republic, Portugal, Romania, Estonia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Slovakia, Lithuania, Hungary

173 Participating forces: UK, France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Denmark, Hungary. Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were not EU Member States at the time of this operation. Czechoslovakia has been counted as two countries to reflect the current status of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, although Czechoslovakia was a single entity in 1991.
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May we look upon our treasures and the furniture of our houses and the garments in which we array ourselves and try whether the seeds of war have any nourishment in these our possessions or not.

John Woolman, 17th century Quaker